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From Town Square to Twittersphere:
The Public Forum Doctrine Goes Digital
- Professor Dawn Carla Nunziato 1
forthcoming 25 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. (2019)
Minds are not changed in streets and parks as they once were. To an
increasing degree, the more significant interchanges of ideas and shaping
of public consciousness occur in mass and electronic media. The extent of
public entitlement to participate in those means of communication may be
changed as technologies change.... 2

Introduction
Government officials like President Donald J. Trump and Maryland Governor Larry
Hogan are increasingly using popular social media sites like Twitter and Facebook to connect
and interact with their constituents and to solicit public comment on matters of public importance
– whether on officially-designated government platforms (like
https://www.facebook.com/GovLarryHogan/ 3) or on unofficial platforms used for the same
purposes. In recent years, government officials have increasingly turned to social media
platforms like Twitter and Facebook in place of (and in addition to) actual town halls and other
real-space forums to solicit public participation in policy formulation and to engage with their
constituents. When such interactions between government officials and their constituents occur
in real space like town halls, they fall comfortably within the scope of the First Amendment's
public forum doctrine, which provides strong protections for freedom of speech and assembly,
1
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and prohibits government officials from discriminating against or silencing speakers based on
their viewpoint. However, when such interactions take place in cyberspace -- on social media
sites like Twitter and Facebook -- the application of the First Amendment's public forum is
somewhat less clear. Social media sites like Twitter and Facebook are privately owned, which
raises issues for the application of the First Amendment’s public forum doctrine. The public
forum doctrine (which provides the greatest protection for free speech in general, as well as
against content and viewpoint discrimination) traditionally applies to government-owned or
government-controlled -- not privately-owned -- property. The private ownership of social
media sites also raises issues for the application of the First Amendment's state action doctrine,
which provides that the restriction of speech by and through private actors does not implicate the
First Amendment except in narrow, limited circumstances.
This Article examines whether and to what extent government officials' use of social
media sites to interact with their constituents constitutes a public forum and what this forum
analysis means for the ability of government officials to block or censor constituents on their
social media sites. Such issues have recently arisen in the context of President Donald Trump’s
blocking of constituents with whom he disagrees on his @realDonaldTrump/Twitter account.
Similar issues have arisen in the context of Maryland Governor Larry Hogan’s and Virginia
County Commissioner Phyllis Randall's blocking of constituents on their Facebook pages, in
response to being asked challenging questions. 4 The recent Supreme Court case of Packingham
v. North Carolina5 sheds some light on the application of the public forum doctrine to social
media sites and the use and misuse of such sites by government officials. In particular, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Packingham extends his functional, expansive conception of

4
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the public forum doctrine to non-traditional forums that function as forums for public discourse. 6
In Part I of this Article, I examine in detail the circumstances surrounding recent incidents in
which government officials have blocked constituents from following them on Twitter and from
commenting on their Facebook pages. Part II undertakes an analysis of the historical
development of the public forum doctrine, its recent development in the digital age, as well as
the government speech doctrine and the contrast between public forums and government speech.
In Part III, I apply the forum analysis developed in Part II to the recent incidents of government
officials' blocking constituents from accessing their social media sites, with an in-depth analysis
of the Trump/Twitter lawsuit in particular, and conclude that such social media sites constitute
public forums in which viewpoint discrimination is illegal. Part IV provides suggestions to
government officials for developing policies governing social media accounts that comply with
the dictates of the First Amendment, and a brief conclusion follows.
I. The Issue: Government Officials' Use of Social Media to Interact with Constituents and to
Block Constituents on the Basis of Viewpoint
In recent years, government officials -- at the local, state, and national level -- have
increasingly turned to social media sites like Facebook and Twitter to communicate and interact
with their constituents. According to the Congressional Research Service, virtually all Members
of Congress have at least one official congressional social media account. 7 Officials have done so
both from official government accounts and from unofficial accounts that they have utilized for
government purposes. Maryland Governor Larry Hogan created an official Facebook page to
make official announcements and to interact with his constituents, 8 while County Commissioner
Phyllis Randall of the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors created an unofficial Facebook
6

Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1735-36.
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page for similar purposes. 9 And President Donald Trump famously uses his Twitter account
@realDonaldTrump (as well as, to a lesser extent, Twitter accounts @POTUS and
@WhiteHouse) to interact with constituents and to provide official announcements on a variety
of government policies. 10 As the Supreme Court recently recognized in Packingham v. North
Carolina, social media sites like Facebook and Twitter are ideal forums where "users can
petition their elected representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner." 11
Problems arises, however, when government officials attempt to limit access to such
forums and to restrict such forums to those who agree with them, while banning those who
challenge or disagree with them -- as Hogan, Randall, and Trump have each recently done. 12
Governor Hogan and Commissioner Randall blocked constituents who posted critical and
challenging comments, 13 while President Trump blocked citizens from following him on Twitter
after they posted critical comments. 14 In each case, the blocked users have sued the government
officials, claiming that these platforms constituted public forums and that their First Amendment
rights were violated by such actions. 15 The government officials have responded that their social
media accounts do not constitute public forums, that they are making personal not government
use of such forums, that their speech is “government speech” immune from the dictates of the

9
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See e.g., Ovetta Wiggins & Fenit Nirappil, Gov. Hogan's Office Has Blocked 450 People From His
Facebook Page in Two Years, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/gov-hogans-office-has-blocked-450-people-from-hisfacebook-page-in-two-years/2017/02/08/54a62e66-ed45-11e6-9973c5efb7ccfb0d_story.html?utm_term=.a9e0287239ed.
14
See e.g., Nancy Coleman, It Doesn't Take Much for Trump to Block You On Twitter, CNN (June 9,
2017, 9:09 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/09/politics/trump-twitter-block-users-trnd/index.html.
15
See Complaint at 3, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017);
Complaint at 2-3, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205).
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Free Speech Clause, and that in any case they enjoy the discretion to block citizens' access to
these accounts and delete users' posts from these accounts. 16 Below I turn to the details of each
of these cases to develop a better understanding of the First Amendment interests at stake.
A. Maryland Governor Larry Hogan Blocks Constituents and Deletes Their Comments From His
Official Facebook Page
Maryland governor Larry Hogan established an official Facebook page -- available at
https://www.facebook.com/GovLarryHogan -- as a means of communicating directly and
interacting with his constituents. 17 Governor Hogan uses his Facebook page as a vehicle to
promote his positions on policy issues, to engage with his constituents, and to share information
about his official activities as governor. 18 Hogan's official Social Media Policy indicated that his
Facebook page was established "to promote and disseminate information on Governor Larry
Hogan's initiatives, events, and personal announcements" and to serve as a "forum for
constructive and respectful discussion with and among users." 19 However, this Policy also
provided that constituents' comments on Hogan's Facebook page may be deleted if they are
"inappropriate" or not on-topic, and further, that comments can be deleted -- and constituents can
be blocked -- "at any time without prior notice or without providing justification." 20
Since establishing his Facebook page, Hogan has blocked over 450 people from
accessing his Facebook page after these people posted comments that the governor apparently
16

See Hogan Answer; Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 13-22, Knight First Amendment
Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205).
17
Governor Larry Hogan (@GovLarryHogan), FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/GovLarryHogan.
18
See Ovetta Wiggins, Why Maryland Gov. Larry Hogan Uses Facebook Much More Than Twitter,
Wash. Post (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/why-maryland-gov-larryhogan-uses-facebook-much-more-than-twitter/2015/12/04/7762554a-87bd-11e5-be390034bb576eee_story.html?utm_term=.c86e897d0ce9 (“‘The governor views social media, especially
Facebook, as a way to talk directly to the people of this state without the interference of traditional
media,’ Hogan spokesman Doug Mayer said. . . Hogan and his communications staff post to Facebook
multiple times a day. . . .”).
19
Exhibit A to Complaint, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
20
Exhibit A to Complaint, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
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viewed as challenging or critical of him. 21 About half of these people were blocked after the
2015 protests in Baltimore related to the controversial police-involved killing of Freddie Gray as
well as following the January 2017 issuance of President Trump's executive order known as the
Muslim ban. 22
In one such case, Meredith Phillips -- a Maryland citizen and former Democrat who
crossed party lines to vote Republican for Governor Hogan -- was blocked from Hogan's
Facebook page after she posted a comment on the page asking Hogan to make a public statement
about President Trump's Muslim ban. 23 Phillips was concerned that Maryland residents had not
heard from Governor Hogan on the issue of Trump's recently-announced Muslim ban and sought
to hear from the governor on the issue. 24 In Phillips's first comment on Hogan's Facebook page
on January 29, 2017 -- two days after President Trump issued the Muslim Ban -- Phillips asked
whether Governor Hogan planned to "speak out on the Muslim ban." 25 Meredith posted her
comment in response to Hogan's then-most-recent post on his Facebook page. 26 A few hours
after posting her comment requesting that Hogan make a public statement about the Muslim ban,
Phillips noticed that her comment had been deleted. 27 Shortly thereafter, Phillips re-posted her

21

See Ovetta Wiggins & Fenit Nirappil, Gov. Hogan's Office Has Blocked 450 People From His
Facebook Page in Two Years, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/mdpolitics/gov-hogans-office-has-blocked-450-people-from-his-facebook-page-in-twoyears/2017/02/08/54a62e66-ed45-11e6-9973c5efb7ccfb0d_story.html?utm_term=.a9e0287239ed(attributing half of the blocks to “hateful or racist”
language, according to Hogan’s spokesman).
22
See Ovetta Wiggins & Fenit Nirappil, Gov. Hogan's Office Has Blocked 450 People From His
Facebook Page in Two Years, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/mdpolitics/gov-hogans-office-has-blocked-450-people-from-his-facebook-page-in-twoyears/2017/02/08/54a62e66-ed45-11e6-9973c5efb7ccfb0d_story.html?utm_term=.a9e0287239ed(attributing half of the blocks to “hateful or racist”
language, according to Hogan’s spokesman).
23
See Complaint at 11, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
24
See Complaint at 12, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
25
See Complaint at 11, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
26
See Complaint at 11, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
27
See Complaint at 11, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
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comment, adding that she "crossed party lines to vote for [Hogan]" and stating that she hoped
Hogan would "stand up for all Marylanders and not just those that agree with [Hogan]." 28 A few
hours after posting her second comment, Phillips observed that this comment had been deleted as
well. 29 When Phillips attempted to re-post her comment for a third time, she found that she was
restricted outright from doing so. 30 Phillips further observed that posts similar to hers were
deleted from Hogan’s Facebook page, while posts ridiculing citizens who were concerned about
the Muslim ban were allowed to remain on the Facebook page. 31 Phillips raised her concerns
with the Governor's Office, but remained blocked from posting comments on Governor Hogan's
official Facebook page. 32
Molly Handley, a resident of Maryland at the time in question, also had her comments on
the Muslim ban deleted from Governor Hogan's Facebook page. 33 Soon after President Trump
announced the Muslim ban, Handley posted comments on Hogan's Facebook page asking Hogan
to make a public statement regarding the ban and urging others to call and ask the governor
about his position on the topic. 34 Her comments were deleted the same day that she posted them,
and Handley also observed that other similar comments regarding the Muslim ban were
deleted. 35
Similarly, Maryland resident James Laurenson made comments challenging Hogan's
policies on Hogan's Facebook page and had his comments deleted. 36 In the fall of 2015,
Laurenson posted several comments on Hogan's Facebook page on the topic of the Syrian
28

Complaint at 11, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
See Complaint at 11, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
30
See Complaint at 11, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
31
See Complaint at 12, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
32
See Complaint at 12-13, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
33
See Complaint at 14, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
34
See Complaint at 14, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
35
See Complaint at 14, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
36
See Complaint at 9, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
29
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refugee crisis, asking the governor to reconsider his request to the Obama Administration to not
allow Syrian refugees into Maryland. 37 In his comments, Laurenson stated his opinion that
turning away Syrians was the wrong response and could even be perceived by ISIS as anti-Arab
and anti-Muslim, which could be used by ISIS against the West. 38 After Laurenson made these
comments, his comments were deleted from Hogan's Facebook page and Laurenson was blocked
from posting any further comments on the page. 39
As a consequence of being blocked from Hogan's Facebook page, these constituents were
unable to engage with Governor Hogan and his other constituents regarding matters of public
importance relating to Hogan's governance.

B. Loudoun County, Virginia, Commissioner Phyllis J. Randall Deletes Constituent's Critical
Comments from her Unofficial Facebook Page
Phyllis Randall is the Chair of the Loudoun County, Virginia, Board of Supervisors, 40
which is the branch of local government responsible for adopting policies and ordinances and
appropriating funds for Loudoun County, Virginia. 41 Randall set up a Facebook page -- the
“Chair Phyllis J. Randall” Facebook page -- to interact with her constituents. 42 She titled her
Facebook page "Chair Phyllis J. Randall, Government Official," and in the About section of the
page, she included her title "Chair of the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors" and provided
links to Loudoun County's official website featuring her profile. 43 The Facebook page featured
images of Randall in front of a United States flag with a plaque inscribed "Phyllis J. Randall
37

See Complaint at 9, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
See Complaint at 9, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
39
See Complaint at 10, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017).
40
See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 707 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017).
41
See Board of Supervisors, VIRGINIA LOUDOUN COUNTY, https://www.loudoun.gov/bos (last visited
July 29, 2018).
42
See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 707.
43
See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 707-08.
38
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Chair-At-Large." 44 On her Facebook page, Randall expressly solicits "back and forth"
communications with and interactions from her constituents and indicates that the page is to be a
channel through which her constituents should reach out to her and interact with her. 45 On this
Facebook page, she indicates: "Everyone, could you do me a favor. I really want to hear from
ANY Loudoun citizen on ANY issues, request, criticism, compliment, or just your thoughts. .... I
really try to keep back and forth conversations ... on my county Facebook page..." 46 Although
she sought to use this Facebook page as a platform for interacting with her constituents, Randall
apparently chose to set up the page outside of the County’s official channels so that she would
not be constrained by the policies applicable to County social media websites. 47 Many of the
posts on her Facebook page involve Randall's work as Chair of the Loudoun County Board of
Supervisors and are specifically addressed to her constituency. 48
In February 2016, Randall participated in a (real space) town hall discussion hosted by
the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors and the Loudoun County School Board. 49 Brian
Davison, a constituent and critic of Randall, attended the panel discussion and anonymously
submitted two questions for discussion during the town hall, one of which was selected for
submission to the panel, which concerned Randall's proposal for an ethics pledge for public
servants. 50 In his question, Davison asked whether School Board members – who Davison
believed had acted unethically – should be required to take such an ethics pledge. 51 Randall
answered the question at the town hall, which she characterized as a "set-up question, " but
44

See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 227 F. Supp. 3d 605, 610-11 (2017).
See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 708.
46
Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at708.
47
See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at707.
48
See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at709-10 (“Many - perhaps most - of the posts . . . are expressly
addressed to “Loudoun” - Defendant’s constituents.”).
49
See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at710.
50
See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at710.
51
See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 710.
45
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Davison found her answer to be inadequate. After Randall responded to his question during the
town hall, Davison tweeted a message at Randall, which read: “@ChairRandall ‘set up
question’? You might want to strictly follow FOIA [the Freedom of Information Act] and the
COIA [the Conflicts of Interest Act] as well.” 52 Later that evening, Randall posted about the
panel discussion on her Facebook page. 53 Davison, persistent in his criticisms of Randall, posted
a related comment on Randall’s Facebook page, in which he continued to advance allegations of
corruption on the part of Loudoun County's School Board and alleged conflicts of interest on the
part of School Board members. 54
Randall took issue with Davison's comments on her Facebook page regarding Loudoun
County School Board members and chose to delete her original post about the panel discussion
and Davison's comment as well. 55 Randall also chose to ban Davison from her Facebook page. 56
As a consequence of being banned from Randall's Facebook page, Davison could not comment
on Randall's posts in a manner that was accessible by all of Randall's constituents who followed
her on that page, nor could he send messages to Randall via her Facebook page. 57
C. President Donald Trump Blocks Individuals from Following his Twitter Account
President Donald Trump makes extensive use of Twitter and, in particular, of his Twitter
account @realDonaldTrump. 58 Although Trump and his administration also make use of other

52

See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 710.
See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 710.
54
See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 711.
55
See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 711.
56
See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 711.
57
See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 711. Davison could, however, still read content posted on Randall's
Facebook page, since it was available to the general public. Id. The following morning, however, Randall
reconsidered her decision to ban Davison from her Facebook page and unbanned him. Id. Accordingly,
Davison was only banned from Randall's website for approximately a 12 hour period, at most. Id.
58
See e.g., Donald J. Trump, Twitter Counter, https://twittercounter.com/realDonaldTrump (last updated
July 14, 2018); Amanda Wills & Alysha Love, All the President's Tweets, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2017/politics/trump-tweets (last updated July 14, 2018).
53
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Twitter accounts -- including @POTUS and @WhiteHouse -- Trump primarily communicates to
the public via his @realDonaldTrump [@RDT] Twitter account. 59 (Indeed, both the
@WhiteHouse account and the @POTUS account indicate that people should follow these
accounts "for the latest from President @realDonaldTrump and his Administration," suggesting
that the @RDT account is the primary source of communications relating to the Trump
Administration. 60 Although Trump established the @RDT account in 2009 prior to being
elected president, Trump now uses this account as his primary channel for communicating with
the public about matters related to his administration and his presidency. 61 Prior to being elected
president, Trump used his @RDT account to tweet about a variety of topics -- like golf, popular
culture, and politics. 62 However, since his inauguration in January 2017, Trump has used the
@RDT predominantly to communicate about matters related to his presidency and his
administration. 63 In addition, Trump has set up his @RDT account in a manner that indicates

59

See e.g., Mike Snider, Is Trump's Blocking of Some
Twitter Users Unconstitutional?, USA TODAY (June 6, 2017, 3:26 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/06/06/trumps-blocking-some-twitter-usersunconstitutional/102549854 (describing the President's use of the @RDT account as “unprecedented”).
60
The While House (@WhiteHouse), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/WhiteHouse. See President Trump
(@POTUS), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/potus(linking to the @RDT account in the account
description).
61
See Robert Loeb, Blocking Twitter Users From the Presidential Account, LAWFARE (June 13, 2017,
5:31 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/blocking-twitter-users-presidential-account-0 (“The President . .
. uses his @realDonaldTrump account to speak to matters as President of the United States. He speaks to
acts of foreign countries, court decisions, legislative proposals, posts video of cabinet meetings, and
expresses his views as President on a host of public policy issues. . . This is not merely a personal social
media account where Mr. Trump posts birthday greetings to friends and family.”).
62
See e.g., Monica Sisavat, Here Are Those Tweets Donald Trump Wrote About Kristen Stewart and
Robert Pattinson, POPSUGAR (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.popsugar.com/celebrity/Donald-Trump-2012Tweets-About-Kristen-Stewart-43112386 (tracking a series of @RDT tweets of Trump commenting on
Twilight star Kristen Stewart and her relationship with co-star Robert Pattinson).
63
See Alex Abdo, @realDonaldTrump and the First Amendment, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE
AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (June 19, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/news/realdonaldtrump-and-firstamendment (“The President uses the [@RDT] account almost exclusively to communicate about
government affairs, including international affairs, economic policy, and appointments to senior
government positions. This is not an account focused on personal interests, say, television, golf courses,
or family.”).
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that it is the official account associated with his presidency. The account is registered to Donald
Trump, "45th President of the United States of America, Washington, D.C.," and the header
pictures associated with the account show images of President Trump performing his official
duties. 64
President Trump tweets frequently from his @RDT account to make announcements and
to engage in advocacy efforts related to his administration and his presidency. Notably, Trump
uses his @RDT account far more frequently than he uses the @POTUS account or the
@WhiteHouse to communicate with the public. 65 His then-Press Secretary Sean Spicer stated
that tweets from President Trump should be understood as "official statements by the President
of the United States" 66 and his social media director Dan Scavino has indicated that all three
Twitter accounts associated with his presidency -- @realDonaldTrump, @POTUS, and
@WhiteHouse -- are channels through which "President Donald J. Trump . . . communicates
with you, the American people!" 67 Trump has used his @realDonalTrump account on a daily
basis for a variety of official governmental purposes: “to announce, describe, and defend his
policies; to promote his Administration’s legislative agenda; to announce official decisions; to
engage with foreign political leaders; to publicize state visits; to challenge media organizations
whose coverage of his Administration he believes to be unfair” (among other purposes). 68 For

64

Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump
As of this writing, the @RDT account has about 38,000 tweets, while the @POTUS account has about
3,000 tweets and the @WhiteHouse account has about 4,500 tweets. Compare Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump, with President Trump
(@POTUS), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/potus, and The White House (@WhiteHouse), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/WhiteHouse.
66
See Ali Vitali, Trump's Tweets 'Official Statements,' Spicer Says, NBC NEWS (June 6, 2017, 5:02 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-s-tweets-official-statements-spicer-says-n768931.
67
Dan Scavino Jr. (@Savino45), TWITTER (June 6, 2017, 3:39 PM),
https://twitter.com/scavino45/status/872221311090778114?lang=en.
68
Complaint at 14, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205)
65
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example, Trump used this account to announce his intention to nominate Christopher Wray for
the position of FBI director, 69 to remove then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson from his
position, 70 and to remove then-Secretary of Veterans Affairs David Shulkin from his position. 71
Trump also used his @RDT account as a vehicle to announce that the United States Government
would no longer accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in the military. 72 Federal courts
regard tweets from @RDT as official statements by and from the president. For example, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cited the president's tweets from his @RDT account
in striking down Executive Order 13,780, which temporarily suspended nationals of certain

69

See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 7, 2017, 4:44 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/872419018799550464?lang=en (tweeting, “I will be
nominating Christopher A. Wray, a man of impeccable credentials, to be the new Director of the FBI.
Details to follow”).
70
See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 13, 2018 5:44 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/973540316656623616?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5
Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E973540316656623616&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fmashable.com%2F201
8%2F03%2F13%2Frex-tillerson-fired-twitter%2F (tweeting, “Mike Pompeo, Director of the CIA, will
become our new Secretary of State. He will do a fantastic job! Thank you to Rex Tillerson for his
service!”).
71
See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 28, 2018, 2:31 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/979108653377703936?lang=en (tweeting, “I am pleased to
announce that I intend to nominate highly respected Admiral Ronny L. Jackson, MD, as the new
Secretary of Veterans Affairs….”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 28, 2018,
2:31 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/979108846408003584 (tweeting, “....In the
interim, Hon. Robert Wilkie of DOD will serve as Acting Secretary. I am thankful to Dr. Shulkin’s
service to our country and to our GREAT VETERANS!”).
72
See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 5:55 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5
Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E890193981585444864&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theatlantic.com%
2Fpolitics%2Farchive%2F2017%2F11%2Fpricking-of-his-thumbs%2F544547%2F (tweeting, “After
consultation with my Generals and military experts, please be advised that the United States Government
will not accept or allow……”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:04
AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890196164313833472?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5
Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E890196164313833472&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theatlantic.com%
2Fpolitics%2Farchive%2F2017%2F11%2Fpricking-of-his-thumbs%2F544547%2F (tweeting,
“....Transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.”).
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countries from entering the United States. 73 In addition, the United States Supreme Court
recently referenced the president’s tweets in its 5-4 decision upholding the revised Muslim travel
ban. 74
Trump's @RDT Twitter account is generally accessible and open to the public, without
regard to political affiliation, ideological position, or viewpoint. 75 As of this date, the account
has approximately 53 million followers and President Trump has not (generally) limited who can
access to his account or what people can say in response to his tweets. 76 Trump's tweets from
the @RDT account generally attract a large number of comments from those who follow the
account on Twitter. 77 Followers are able to interact with and engage with the president's tweets
in a number of ways. First, followers can view the president's tweets (as can anyone with access
to Twitter). Second, followers of @RDT can retweet his tweets. Third, followers can "like" his
tweets. Fourth, and most significantly for purposes of this Article, followers can reply to his
tweets. 78 The president's tweets from @RDT generally garner a substantial amount of

73

See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 773 n.14 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (June 5, 2017, 6:20 PM,
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/871899511525961728).
74
In Trump v. Hawaii, both the majority and the dissent refer to Trump’s tweets regarding the Muslim
ban in analyzing the constitutionality of the Executive Order at issue. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417, 2437-3
(2018). See also Brian Fung, The Supreme Court's Travel Ban Ruling Could Have Big Implications For
Trump's Twitter Account, WASH. POST (June 26, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/06/26/supreme-courts-travel-ban-ruling-could-havebig-implications-trumps-twitter-account/?utm_term=.07adab122704 (“Both in the opinion and the
dissents, the Justices consistently adopted the perspective that Trump’s broadcasts on Twitter are an
official reflection of the White House -- not merely the personal feelings of a private individual, as the
government has claimed elsewhere.”).
75
See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump.
76
See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump.
77
See also Ashley Hoffman, President's Trump's Top Tweets of All Time Show a Stark Divide, TIME
(Apr. 28, 2017), http://time.com/4758366/trump-most-popular-tweets-ever (tracking Trump’s most
popular tweets).
78
See e.g., Charlie Warzel, Inside the Chaotic Battle to be the Top Reply to a Trump Tweet, BUZZFEED
(June 9, 2017, 1:31 PM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/charliewarzel/trollpotusgrowthhack?utm_term=.eoV5gYveO#.nivZP6gko
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engagement from members of the public, with typical responses including tens of thousands of
replies. 79 For example, within the three hour period after Trump tweeted his ban on transgender
individuals in the military, the three tweets announcing the change in policy had been retweeted
approximately 121,000 times, liked 382,000 times, and replied to 142,000 times. 80 Replies to
tweets on Twitter are iterative, and include replies to an initial tweet, as well as replies to replies.
This interactive and iterative thread of commentary related to a particular tweet is referred to as
the "comment thread," which includes multiple overlapping comments and responses among
Twitter users. Each tweet from the president's @RDT account engenders an extensive
interactive response from members of the public who follow the president’s account on Twitter,
with thousands of retweets, likes, and replies composing an extensive and detailed iterative
comment thread. 81

(“Most importantly, the top reply to a Trump tweet is guaranteed to get in front of hundreds of thousands
of eyes.”).
79
E.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 31, 2016, 5:17 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/815185071317676033?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5
Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E815185071317676033&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Ftime.com%2F4758366
%2Ftrump-most-popular-tweets-ever%2F (garnering over 131,000 retweets, over 332,000 likes, and over
76,000 comments on his tweet wishing a happy new year "to my many enemies and those who have
fought me and lost so badly they just don't know what to do").
80
See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 5:55 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5
Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E890193981585444864&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theatlantic.com%
2Fpolitics%2Farchive%2F2017%2F11%2Fpricking-of-his-thumbs%2F544547%2F (retweeted over
39,600 times; liked over 119,110 times; and replied to over 25,000 times); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:04 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890196164313833472?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5
Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E890196164313833472&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theatlantic.com%
2Fpolitics%2Farchive%2F2017%2F11%2Fpricking-of-his-thumbs%2F544547%2F (retweeted over
41,700 times; liked over 129,300 times; and replied to over 45,000 times); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:08 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890197095151546369?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5
Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E890197095151546369&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnn.com%2F201
7%2F07%2F26%2Fpolitics%2Ftrump-military-transgender%2Findex.html (retweeted over 39,700 times;
liked over 133,700 times; and replied to over 72,000 times).
81
See e.g., Warzel, supra note X (describing the “race” of followers to reply to a Trump tweet because of
the increase in followers those replying experience with their own Twitter accounts).
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Among the 53 million individuals who follow Trump on his @RDT Twitter account,
several of them have responded to his tweets in a manner that was critical or questioning of the
president. Several individuals who followed @RDT and who tweeted replies that were critical or
questioning of the president or his policies were blocked from following his Twitter account
shortly after they posted their critical questions or replies. 82 One such individual, Joseph Papp, is
a former professional road cyclist and current anti-doping advocate. 83 Prior to being blocked, Mr.
Papp was active in following and engaging with Trump's tweets on @RDT, posting replies that
appeared in Trump's comment threads and were accessible by the millions who follow Trump on
@RDT. 84 Mr. Papp's replies had also been quoted in media articles describing citizen responses
to Trump. 85 On June 3, 2017, President Trump tweeted a video of his weekly presidential
address. 86 A few minutes later, Mr. Papp replied to this tweet with a pair of linked tweets that
said "Greetings from Pittsburgh, Sir," and "Why didn't you attend your #PittsburghNotParis rally
in DC, Sir?" 87 The next day, on June 4, 2017, Mr. Papp learned that he had been blocked from
following President Trump on his @RDT account. 88
Another such individual who was blocked from following Trump on his @RDT account
is Rebecca Buckwalter, a writer and political analyst whose articles have been published by
82

See e.g., Ashley Feinberg, A Running List of People Donald Trump Has Blocked on Twitter, WIRED
(June 14, 2017, 3:38 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/donald-trump-twitter-blocked (tracking the
Twitter users blocked by Trump).
83
See Complaint at 22, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205).
84
See Exhibit H to Joint Stipulation of Facts, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump,
302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205).
85
See Complaint at 22, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205).
86
See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 3, 2017, 12:53 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/871087981225926656.
87
See Joe Papp (@joepabike), TWITTER (June 3, 2017, 12:36 PM),
https://twitter.com/joepabike/status/871088288202928128; Joe Papp (@joepabike), TWITTER (June 3,
2017, 12:39 PM), https://twitter.com/joepabike/status/871089057098551296.
88
See Complaint at 22, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205).
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media outlets such as The Atlantic, National Public Radio, and CNN. 89 Ms. Buckwalter had
been active in following Trump on his @RDT account and frequently replying to Trump's
tweets, such that her replies appeared in Trump's comment threads and were accessible by the
millions who follow Trump on his @RDT account. 90 On June 6, 2017, President Trump tweeted
"Sorry folks, but if I would have relied on the Fake News of CNN, NBC, ABC, CBS washpost or
nytimes, I would have had ZERO chance of winning WH." 91 In response to this tweet,
Buckwalter replied, "To be fair you didn't win the WH: Russia won it for you." 92 Buckwalter's
reply tweet in the @RDT comment thread, in turn, received over nine thousand likes and over
three thousand retweets. 93 Shortly thereafter, Buckwalter learned that she was blocked from the
president's @RDT account. 94
Brandon Neely was another avid follower of Trump on his @RDT account who engaged
frequently with Trump and his followers via the @RDT account. 95 Neely is a police officer and
Iraq War Veteran with a Twitter account followed by approximately 10,200 people. 96 When
Neely replied to and commented on the president's tweets from @RDT, Neely's comments

89

See Complaint at 17, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205).
90
See Exhibit C to Joint Stipulation of Facts, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump,
302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205).
91
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 6, 2017, 5:15 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/872064426568036353?lang=en.
92
RPBP (@rpbp), TWITTER (June 6, 2017, 5:16 AM), https://twitter.com/rpbp/status/8720647230843330.
93
See RPBP (@rpbp), TWITTER (June 6, 2017, 5:16 AM),
https://twitter.com/rpbp/status/8720647230843330.
94
See Complaint at 17, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205).
95
See Exhibit G to Joint Stipulation of Facts, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump,
302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205) (listing tweets and replies from Brandon
Neely’s Twitter, @BrandonTXNeely).
96
See Complaint at 21, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205); Brandon Neely (@BrandonTXNeely), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/BrandonTXNeely?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
.
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frequently appeared at the top of the comment threads associated with @RDT. 97 On June 12,
2017, President Trump tweeted "Congratulations! First new Coal Mine of Trump Era Opens in
Pennsylvania," and included a link to a Fox News article about the mine's opening. 98 In response
to the president's tweet, Mr. Neely replied, "Congrats and now black lung won't be covered under
#TrumpCare." 99 Mr. Neely's reply tweet drew a fair amount of attention, receiving 3,181 likes
and 338 retweets. 100 The next day, on June 13, 2017, Mr. Neely learned that he had been
blocked from following the president on his @RDT account. Several other followers of
Trump's @RDT Twitter account were blocked after making similar critical comments or posing
critical questions to Trump as replies to his tweets. 101

97

See Complaint at 21, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205).
98
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 12, 2017, 10:59 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/874325287143604224?lang=en.
99
Brandon Neely (@BrandonTXNeely), TWITTER (June 12, 2017, 11:00 AM),
https://twitter.com/BrandonTXNeely/status/874325611334029313.
100
See Brandon Neely (@BrandonTXNeely), TWITTER (June 12, 2017, 11:00 AM),
https://twitter.com/BrandonTXNeely/status/874325611334029313.
101
Four other individuals joined Buckwalter, Papp, and Neely, in a suit brought by the Knight First
Amendment Institute at Columbia University, to challenge the president's act of blocking them from
following his @RDT account, after these individuals were blocked for posting similar types of questions
and comments in response to tweets from the president on his @RDT account. See Complaint at 3-4,
Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No.
1:17 Civ. 05205). Philip Cohen, a sociology professor at University of Maryland College Park and avid
follower of the president’s @RDT Twitter account, was blocked after posting a critical response to a
Trump tweet. See Complaint at 18, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F.
Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). See also Exhibit D to Joint Stipulation of Facts,
Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No.
1:17 Civ. 05205) (listing tweets and replies from Philip Cohen’s Twitter, @familyunequal). On June 6,
2017, Trump tweeted "#ICYMI [In Case You Missed It] Announcement of Air Traffic Control
Initiative...Watch," which provided a link to an announcement of an Air Traffic Control Initiative. Donald
J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 6, 2017, 5:44 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/872253002266161153?lang=en. Professor Cohen tweeted a
reply showing a picture of the president with the words "Corrupt Incompetent Authoritarian. And then
there are the policies. Resist." Philip N Cohen (@familyunequal), TWITTER (June 6, 2017, 5:45 PM),
https://twitter.com/familyunequal/status/872253179915841536. Professor Cohen’s reply tweet received
over 300 likes and 35 retweets. See Complaint at 18, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v.
Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). Shortly after Professor Cohen
tweeted his reply, he was blocked from following the president on his @RDT account. See Complaint at
18, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
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(No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). Holly Figueroa, a national political organizer and songwriter, was an avid follower
of the president on his @RDT account. See Complaint at 19 Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). See also Exhibit E to Joint
Stipulation of Facts, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205) (listing tweets and replies from Holly Figueroa’s Twitter,
@AynRandPaulRyan). Many of her replies to the president’s tweets garnered thousands of responses in
the form of likes and retweets and appeared at or near the top of the president’s comment threads. See
Complaint at 19, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). On May 28, 2017, the president addressed the terrorist attack in
Manchester, England, by tweeting “British Prime Minister May was very angry that the info the U.K.
gave to the U.S. about Manchester was leaked. Gave me full details!” Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 28, 2017, 7:43 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/868840252227674113?lang=en. In response to the president’s
tweet, Ms. Figueroa replied with a tweet (which in turn received 15,000 likes) containing a picture of the
Pope looking incredulously at the president, along with the tweet “This is pretty much how the whole
world sees you.” Holly Figueroa O'Reilly BWCS (@AynRyanPaulRyan), TWITTER (May 28, 2017, 7:53
AM),
https://twitter.com/AynRandPaulRyan/status/868842669069422592?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%
5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E868842669069422592&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnbc.com%2F2
018%2F05%2F23%2Fread-the-tweets-that-got-these-people-blocked-on-twitter-by-president-donaldtrump.html. Hours later, Ms. Figueroa learned that she was blocked from following the president on his
@RDT Twitter account. See Complaint at 19, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump,
302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). Eugene Gu, a resident in general surgery,
was an avid follower of the president’s @RDT Twitter account, with some of his replies to
@realDonaldTrump receiving thousands of likes and appearing on “Twitter Moments” (Twitter’s
encapsulation of current events that incorporate particularly popular tweets). See Complaint at 20, Knight
First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ.
05205). See also source Exhibit F to Joint Stipulation of Facts, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205) (listing tweets and replies
from Eugene Gu’s Twitter, @eugenegu). On June 28, 2017 at 4:02 am, the president tweeted “The new
Rasmussen Poll, one of the most accurate in the 2016 Election, just out with a Trump 50% Approval
Rating. That’s higher than O’s #’s!” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 18, 2017,
4:02 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/876394578777174021?lang=en. In response to the
president’s tweet, Mr. Gu replied “Covfefe: The same guy who doesn’t proofread his Twitter handles the
nuclear button” (in which Mr. Gu referred to the president’s unexplained tweet from May 31, 2017, which
read in full: “Despite the constant negative press covfefe.”) Eugene Gu, MD (@eugenegu), TWITTER
(June 18, 2017, 4:12 AM), https://twitter.com/eugenegu/status/876397178780078081. See also Matt
Flegenheimer, What's a 'Covfefe'? Trump Tweet Unites a Bewildered Nation, N.Y. TIMES (May 31,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/us/politics/covfefe-trump-twitter.html. Mr. Gu’s reply tweet
received 2,900 likes and 239 retweets. See Eugene Gu, MD (@eugenegu), TWITTER (June 18, 2017, 4:12
AM), https://twitter.com/eugenegu/status/876397178780078081. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Gu learned that
he had been blocked from following the president on his @RDT Twitter account. See Complaint at 20,
Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No.
1:17 Civ. 05205). Nick Pappas, a comic and writer, was an avid follower of the president’s @RDT
Twitter account, and his replies to the president often received thousands of likes and retweets. See
Complaint at 22, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). See also Exhibit I to Joint Stipulation of Facts, Knight First
Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ.
05205) (listing tweets and replies from Nick Pappas’s Twitter, @Pappiness). On June 5, 2017, the
president tweeted “The Justice Dept. should ask for an expedited hearing of the watered down Travel Ban
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As a result of being blocked from following Trump's @RDT account, these blocked
individuals were no longer able to interact or engage with the president's tweets on his extensive
Twitter platform or to participate and engage in the wide-ranging policy discussions that the
president's tweets engender. 102 Specifically, individuals blocked from following the president's
@RDT Twitter account cannot view tweets from @RDT on the Twitter platform, cannot reply to
these tweets, and cannot reply to replies on these tweets. 103 In addition, the blocked individuals’
tweets replying to the president's tweets are not viewable by the millions of Americans who
follow the president on his @RDT account. 104 As such, blocked individuals are prohibited from
meaningfully engaging and interacting with the president's tweets on his Twitter platform of
choice, which is his chosen and preferred means of engaging with his constituents, the American
people. 105

before the Supreme Court - & seek much tougher version!” and “In any event we are EXTREME
VETTING people coming into the U.S. in order to keep our country safe. The courts are slow and
political!” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 5, 2017, 3:37 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/871677472202477568?lang=en; Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 5, 2017, 3:44 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/871679061847879682?lang=en. In response to the president’s
tweets, Mr. Pappas replied, “Trump is right. The government should protect the people. That’s why the
courts are protecting us from him.” Nick Jack Pappas (@Pappiness), TWITTER (June 5, 2017, 3:50 AM),
https://twitter.com/Pappiness/status/871680720707747840. This tweet received 395 retweets and 1,181
likes. See Complaint at 23, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d
541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). Within a few hours of replying to the president, Mr. Pappas
learned that he was blocked from following the president on his @RDT Twitter account. See Complaint
at 23, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(No. 1:17 Civ. 05205).
102
See How to Block Accounts on Twitter, TWITTER HELP CENTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/usingtwitter/blocking-and-unblocking-accounts (last visited July 15, 2018) (listing the actions that a blocked
account cannot take).
103
See Cross-Motion of Plaintiff for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 14, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d
541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205).
104
See How to Block Accounts on Twitter, TWITTER HELP CENTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/usingtwitter/blocking-and-unblocking-accounts (last visited July 15, 2018) (advising users that “[t]weets from
blocked accounts will not appear in your timeline”).
105
See e.g., Nicholas Carr, Why Trump Tweets (And Why We Listen), POLITICO (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/26/donald-trump-twitter-addiction-216530 (analyzing
Trump’s “fixation” with Twitter).
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D. Lawsuits Challenging Government Officials' Blocking of Users from Social Media Forums
In each of the cases described above, citizens who were blocked by government officials
from engaging with them on the officials' social media forums brought suit, claiming that their
First Amendment rights had been violated. The Maryland citizens claimed, in their suit against
Governor Hogan, that the comment space on Governor Hogan's Facebook page constituted a
public forum for speech and that the Social Media Policy under which Hogan blocked citizens
who questioned or criticized his policies constituted illegal viewpoint discrimination within a
public forum. 106 Similarly, Virginia citizen Brian Davison claimed, in his suit against the
Loudoun County Board of Supervisors, that the comment space on Commissioner Randall's
Facebook page constituted a public forum for speech and that the blocking of Davison based on
his critical comments about Randall constituted illegal viewpoint discrimination within that
public forum. 107 And the seven Twitter users who were blocked from accessing President
Trump's @RDT Twitter account also claimed that the interactive space on Trump's account
constituted a public forum from which they were unconstitutionally blocked based on their
viewpoints. 108 In each case, the government officials responded by asserting that the forums at
issue were not properly considered public forums under the First Amendment public forum
doctrine. 109 Instead, they assert that they were operating these accounts in their personal capacity

106

See Complaint at 3, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017)
(alleging that Governor Hogan, through the social media policy “engag[ed] in unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination to remove certain ideas or perspectives from a broader public debate”).
107
See Complaint at 7, Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. May
10, 2017).
108
See Complaint at 2-3, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205)..
109
See Hogan Answer; Defendants Loudoun County Board of Supervisors and Phyllis Randall's
Memorandum In Support of Motion For Summary Judgment Filed Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) at 14,
Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, (E.D. Va. 2017) (No. 1:16 Civ.
00932); Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 11, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205).
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not in their official government capacity, and that they therefore enjoy the First Amendment
right to delete comments and/or block individuals from these forums. 110 In the alternative, they
argue that if these sites are viewed as governmental, their speech constitutes "government
speech," which is immune from scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause. 111 Before analyzing
these cases in greater detail, below I examine the historical development, evolution, and
importance of the public forum doctrine in American First Amendment jurisprudence, as well as
the recently developed government speech doctrine, under which government expression is
immune from scrutiny under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause.
II. The Development and Evolution of the Public Forum Doctrine
A. Introduction
The public forum doctrine mandates that the government facilitate speech by requiring
that certain forums be made or held available for uncensored discussion, debate, and exercise of
other First Amendment freedoms. 112 This doctrine, which grows out of the 1939 case of Hague
v. CIO, 113 imposes obligations on the government to facilitate speech without discrimination on
the basis of viewpoint within places that are traditionally devoted to or are well-suited to the
exercise of such freedoms -- such as public parks, sidewalks and streets -- as well as within

110

See Hogan Answer; Defendants Loudoun County Board of Supervisors and Phyllis Randall's
Memorandum In Support of Motion For Summary Judgment Filed Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) at 14,
Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, (E.D. Va. 2017) (No. 1:16 Civ.
00932) (challenging the assertion that Randall’s Facebook page is a public forum because it “was created
and controlled by her personally and is not subject to control or administration by the County or subject t
its social media policy”); Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 11, Knight First Amendment
Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205)
(classifying Trump’s Twitter use as an official’s “routine[] engage[ment] in personal conduct that is not
an exercise of state power”).
111
See Hogan Answer; Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 15, Knight First Amendment
Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205).
112
See e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“In places which
by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the State
to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”).
113
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 494 (1939).
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places that the government has chosen to open up for expressive purposes, whether those places
are government-owned or privately-owned but government-controlled. 114
Since the Supreme Court’s adoption of the public forum doctrine in the mid-twentieth
century, the state and "state actors" 115 have been constitutionally required to facilitate and to
refrain from suppressing speech on the basis of viewpoint within such forums. 116 Under the
public forum doctrine, the government is held to exacting standards regarding its ability to
restrict speech within such forums. 117 The existence of public forums like public sidewalks,
streets, and parks advances free speech values by providing forums for individuals to
communicate with and reach out to broad general audiences as well as to particularly relevant
specific audiences. 118 The Supreme Court has recognized that the availability of such forums in
which individuals are ensured the meaningful right and opportunity to express themselves has
been central to freedom of expression and to democratic self-government “from time
immemorial.” 119 Because of the important function that such public places serve in facilitating
the exchange of ideas and expression in democracies, the public forum doctrine imposes upon
the government the obligation to preserve and protect such places for free expression. 120

114

See, e.g., Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1735 (“A basic rule, for example, is that a street or park is a
quintessential forum for the exercise of First Amendment rights); source 66 at 555 (holding a private
theater leased by the government as a public forum).
115
See text accompanying notes x-y.
116
See Rosenberger v. Rector Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (explaining that the
State is forbidden from “exercising viewpoint discrimination, even when the limited public forum is one
of its own creation”).
117
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (“The government must abstain from regulating speech when the
specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the
restriction.”).
118
See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
119
See Hague, 307 U.S. at 513 (protecting the right to peaceably petition the government as “an attribute
of national citizenship”).
120
See Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1735 (identifying public forums as “essential venues for public
gatherings to celebrate some views, to protest others, or simply to learn and inquire”).
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The Supreme Court championed the values served by the public forum in what is known
as its first public forum case, Hague v. CIO. 121 This case arose out of a dispute between members
of the Committee for Industrial Organization (now part of the AFL-CIO) and Jersey City, New
Jersey, which was hostile to the message that the CIO sought to communicate. 122 Members of
the CIO sought to conduct informational outreach in various public venues in Jersey City to
explain to City workers the purposes and benefits of the National Labor Relations Act and to
distribute pamphlets on the subject. 123 CIO members repeatedly sought from the City -- and were
repeatedly denied -- permission to lease the city hall to conduct public meetings and/or distribute
their pamphlets in city streets and other similar public places. 124 When CIO members continued
attempting to express their message in these public places, the mayor ordered them arrested and
literally ferried out of the City on boats bound for New York. 125
In response to the CIO’s claim that the City violated its First Amendment rights, the City
argued that its right to exclude people from City property was as absolute as that of a private
property owner to exclude people from his or her home, and that the City therefore enjoyed the
power to exclude whichever citizens it chose for whatever reasons it chose from City property. 126
The CIO contended that the City was chargeable with different duties than those of a private
owner of property – duties to facilitate the expression of members of the public on matters of
public importance. 127 The Supreme Court agreed. 128 In ushering in the modern public forum
doctrine, the Court explained that the existence and flourishing of our form of democratic self-

121

307 U.S. 496 (1939).
See Hague, 307 U.S. at 501.
123
See Hague, 307 U.S. at 501-02.
124
See Hague, 307 U.S. at 502-03.
125
See Hague, 307 U.S. at 502.
126
See Hague, 307 U.S. at 514.
127
See Hague, 307 U.S. at 514-16.
128
See Hague, 307 U.S. at 514-16.
122
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government require that citizens enjoy meaningful opportunities to express themselves and
meaningful venues in which to do so:
The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the
part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. . . . Citizenship of the
United States would be little better than a name if it did not carry with it
the right to discuss national legislation and the benefits, advantages, and
opportunities to accrue to citizens therefrom. 129

The Court rejected Jersey City’s claim that its right to exclude was as absolute as that of a private
property owner and adopted what is now known as the public forum doctrine, in which the
government is charged with the obligation to facilitate speech without discrimination on certain
types of property:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public, and time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and
public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of
the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views
on national questions . . . must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged
or denied. 130
Accordingly, in Hague v. CIO, the Court imposed on government actors the obligation
not to discriminate against, and to accord the widest possible latitude to, speech within property
like streets and parks that has “immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public … for
purposes of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and discussing public
questions.” 131 Within these “traditional public forums,” individuals are guaranteed not just the
right in theory but also the meaningful opportunity in practice to express themselves.
Eight months after the Hague decision, the Supreme Court solidified its newly-articulated
129

See Hague, 307 U.S. at 513 (internal quotations omitted).
See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16.
131
See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
130
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public forum doctrine in the case of Schneider v. State. 132 In Schneider, individuals who had
handed out leaflets on a public street announcing a protest were convicted of violating an
ordinance prohibiting the distribution of leaflets on public streets. 133 The municipality defended
the ordinance on the grounds that it was designed to prevent littering and that there were other
venues available to the speakers to disseminate their message. 134 Rejecting the municipality’s
argument, the Court explained that the government has an obligation to facilitate speech within
places that are well-suited to such expression. 135 Justice Roberts wrote:
The streets are natural and proper places for the dissemination of
information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty
of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place. 136
In both Hague and Schneider, the Supreme Court underscored the importance that the
unrestricted, uncensored free flow of information serves in our system of democratic selfgovernment. Because the right to engage in such speech is “so vital to the maintenance of
democratic institutions” and is implied within “the very idea of government, republic in form,”
the government is not permitted to restrict the exercise of free speech on such property. 137
Not all public property enjoys public forum status, however.

Property such as

government-owned office buildings, state prisons, and places that are not held open by the
government or traditionally used for expressive purposes are not considered public forums in

132

308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
See Schneider, 308 U.S at 155.
134
See Schneider, 308 U.S at 155-56.
135
See Schneider, 308 U.S at 160 (“Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep
their communities’ streets open and available for movement of people and property, the primary purpose
to which the streets are dedicated.”).
136
Schneider, 308 U.S. at 160 (emphasis added).
137
Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161; Hague, 307 U.S. at 513.
133
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which the state is obligated to facilitate citizens’ free speech rights. 138 But, within governmentowned property that has traditionally been available for expressive purposes -- like public parks,
streets, sidewalks -- or property that the government has made available for expressive purposes,
all speakers are permitted to express themselves. 139 It is within these public forums that citizens
enjoy the fullest and most meaningful protection of their right to free expression. 140

The

government is required to permit speech within such forums 141– regardless of the content of such
speech or the viewpoint of the speaker – and any restrictions on speech within such forums are
subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny. 142 The mandate that the government preserve forums for
the nondiscriminatory exercise of the right of free speech provides a crucial safeguard for free
expression. Speakers can enter traditional public forums like public parks, streets, and sidewalks,
and express themselves with the assurance that their speech cannot be censored by the forum
owner on the basis of viewpoint or subject matter. 143
After its initial inception in the mid-twentieth century, the development of the public
forum doctrine became more complex. Recent Supreme Court cases have broken out public
forums into the following categories 144: (1) traditional public forums; (2) designated public

138

In particular, authoritarian government forums, like prisons, military bases, and schools, are generally
considered non-public forums. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966) (county jail not a
public forum); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (military base not a public forum).
139
See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (recognizing traditional public fora as “places which by long
tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate”). As I explain infra, within a
designated public forum devoted to particular subjects, however, the government may impose restrictions
limiting expression to the particular subject matter(s) for which the forum is designated. See text
accompanying notes x-y.
140
See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (describing the State’s right to limit expressive activity in
traditional public fora as “sharply circumscribed”).
141
See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (1983).
142
See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (requiring “exacting scrutiny” for “facially
content-based restriction[s] on political speech in a public forum”).
143
See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (prohibiting states from “prohibit[ing] all communicative
activity”).
144
In Perry, the Court provided an especially clear overview of its recent public forum jurisprudence,
explaining:
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forums (both of general purpose and limited purpose); and (3) nonpublic forums.145
“Traditional” public forums consist of streets, sidewalks, and parks and other places that “have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discerning public
questions.” 146 The Court has recently made clear that this category is limited to streets,
sidewalks, and parks and will not readily be expanded. 147 “Designated public forums” consist of
government-owned or government-controlled property that has not “immemorially” been used

At one end of the spectrum are streets and parks, which have immemorially been held in trust for
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.... In these [traditional
public forums or] quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all
communicative activity. For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion, it must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end. ... The State may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of
expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. ... A second category
[designated public forums] consists of public property which the State has opened for use by the
public as a place for expressive activity. The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain
exclusions from a forum generally open to the public even if it was not required to create the
forum in the first place. Although a State is not required to indefinitely retain the open character
of the facility, as long as it does so, it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional
public forum. Reasonable time, place, and manner regulations are permissible, and a contentbased prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.... Public
property which is not, by tradition or designation, a forum for public communication [nonpublic
forums] is governed by different standards. ... In addition to time, place, and manner regulations,
the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as
the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker's view. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
145

The category of nonpublic forums includes places like military bases, jail grounds, and federal
workplaces, that the government owns but which it has not opened up for expressive activity on the part
of the public. See e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46-47 (classifying a school mail facility as a
nonpublic forum).
146
Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
147
See, e.g., Arkansas Ed. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U. S. 666 , 679 (1998) (explaining that
“[t]he Court has rejected the view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its historic
confines.”) Recent cases have also made clear that not all expressive activity within a public street,
sidewalk, or park will be treated the same under the public forum doctrine. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City
v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009), discussed infra. Rather, the Court will consider the nature and the type
of access sought within the forum at issue. See text accompanying notes x - y.
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for expressive purposes but which the government has opened up and designated as a place for
public expressive activity. 148 The government may choose, for example, to open up property
within a public school,149 public university meeting facilities, 150 or privately-owned municipal
theaters leased by the government 151 as forums for expression generally or for expression on
certain designated subjects. Within a general-purpose designated public forum, the government
is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of the content, subject matter, or viewpoint of the
speech at issue. 152 Within a limited-purpose designated public forum (also known as a “limited
public forum”), once the government has defined the subject matter limitations of the forum (for
example, by limiting the forum to speech on social, civic, and recreational topics 153), the
government may restrict the forum to speech that concerns those subjects, but beyond such
permissible subject-matter restrictions, regulation is subject to the same stringent limitations as
those governing a traditional public forum, and viewpoint discrimination is strictly prohibited.154

148

See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (1983)
See City of Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisc. Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 176
(1976) (“[W]hen the [school] board sits in public meetings to conduct public business and hear the views
of citizens, it may not be required to discriminate between speakers on the basis of their employment, or
the content of their speech.”).
150
See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (“Through its policy of accommodating their
meetings, the University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups. Having done so,
the University has assumed an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable
constitutional norms.”).
151
See Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (concluding that the
auditoriums at issue “were public forums designed for and dedicated to expressive activities”).
152
See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 (requiring states that choose to indefinitely retain the open
character of the facility to do so “by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum”).
153
See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387 (1993) (school
district restricted the use of school property after school hours to social, civic, and recreational uses of
such property).
154
See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (describing the regulation of
designated public forums as “subject to the same limitations as that governing a traditional public
forum”). Members of the Court have had a difficult time agreeing upon what constitutes a permissible
subject matter or content restriction within a limited public forum and what constitutes an impermissible
viewpoint restriction within limited public forums. In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of
Virginia, for example, the forum at issue was the University’s funding scheme for student publications,
which authorized payment from the Student Activities Fund for the costs of printing of student
149
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Thus, within traditional public forums such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, and within
designated public forums such as public meeting places devoted to expression on particular
subjects, individuals enjoy their most robust rights of free expression. Government restrictions
on speech within both types of public forums are subject to the most stringent scrutiny. Speech
restrictions will not be upheld unless they serve compelling government interests and are the
least restrictive means of restricting such speech. Content-based discrimination is generally
prohibited, 155 and viewpoint-based discrimination is absolutely prohibited, within such forums.
In circumstances where it is unclear whether the government has designated a public
forum by opening up a nontraditional forum for public discourse, courts will look predominantly
to two factors: (1) the policy and practice of the government or the government official with
respect to its use of the property; (2) the nature of the property at issue and the compatibility of
the property with expressive activity. 156 Although the government will frequently have the
incentive to argue that it did not open up the property at issue at all, or for the type of speech that

publications but prohibited payment from the Fund for the costs of printing for any publication that
“primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.” 515 U.S.
819, 836 (1995). The student publication “Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective At the University of
Virginia,” which published a journal that offered a “Christian perspective” on issues such as racism, crisis
pregnancy, homosexuality, and eating disorders, was denied funding under this scheme, and sued. See id.
at 826-27. The Justices agreed that the funding scheme constituted a limited public forum for private
speech, but disagreed as to whether limiting funding only to those student publications that did not
“primarily promote or manifest a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality” constituted a
subject matter/topic restriction or a viewpoint restriction. Id. at 836. In the Opinion of the Court, Justice
Kennedy explained that this restriction amounted to viewpoint discrimination, because it was the religious
perspective of the journal, rather than the subjects discussed, that triggered the university’s refusal to pay
for the printing costs of the journal. See id. 68 at 834. In his dissent, Justice Souter construed the
restriction as a permissible subject matter restriction of denying funding for “the entire subject matter of
religious apologetics,” not an impermissible restriction on the basis of viewpoint and concluded that if the
policy at issue in the case “amounts to viewpoint discrimination, the Court has all but eviscerated the line
between viewpoint and content.” Id. at 896-98 (Souter, J., dissenting).
155
Restrictions based on content or topic are only permitted only where necessary to confine the limited
purpose designated public forum to the limited purposes for which it was created. See, e.g., Rosenberger,
515 U.S. at (explaining that “the necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes
for which it was created may justify the State in reserving it for … the discussion of certain topics. . . .”).
156
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802.
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the petitioner seeks to engage in, courts generally will look not just to the government’s claims
on this issue but to objective factors surrounding the policy and practice of the government, the
nature of the property, and its compatibility with expressive activity.
For example, in the case of City of Madison, Joint School District #8 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission, the School Board and the City of Madison, Wisconsin,
maintained that they had opened up a public forum that was limited in scope and that they were
justified in limiting petitioner’s speech on the grounds that it was outside that limited scope.157
The Court held that, once a meeting of the Board of Education had been made open to the public,
the Board could not discriminate against speakers on the basis of their viewpoint. 158 In that case,
the school board and the City of Madison had convened a public meeting with a broad agenda
(which included employment matters) and invited all members of the public to attend. 159 During
the meeting, the Board sought to silence the speech of an individual who intended to speak on
collective bargaining matters. 160

While recognizing that the School Board was entitled to

conduct private meetings that were not open to the public and to limit the agenda of its meetings,
the Court explained that, once the Board opened up its meetings to the public for direct citizen
involvement and sat to conduct public business and hear the views of its citizens, it could not
silence a speaker “seeking to express his views on an important decision of the government,” nor
could it discriminate among speakers on the basis of the viewpoint or content of their speech or
the nature of their employment. 161 The Court observed that “to permit one side of a debatable
public question to have a monopoly in expressing its views to the government is the antithesis of

157

429 U.S. 167, 172 (1976)
See Madison Joint Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 175.
159
See Madison Joint Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 171.
160
See Madison Joint Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 173.
161
Madison Joint Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 175.
158
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constitutional guarantees.” 162

Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, emphasized that it was

constitutionally impermissible for the government to allow for selective exclusions from public
forums it had opened up, explaining that, in the case at bar, “the state body has created a public
forum dedicated to the expression of views by the general public” and that "once a forum is
opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from
assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say.” 163
Similarly, in the case of Widmar v. Vincent, the government sought to maintain that it had
opened up a public forum of a limited scope, not including religious purposes, but the Court held
that objective factors supported the conclusion that the forum was not so limited. 164 In that case,
the University of Missouri at Kansas City had adopted the policy and practice of making its
meeting facilities generally available to all registered student groups, but sought to limit the
facilities’ use to non-religious purposes and discussions. 165 The Court found that the University’s
policy evidenced a clear intent to create a public forum for use by all registered student groups,
and therefore held that the university could not withhold access from student groups and
speakers based on the desire to use this generally open forum to engage in religious
discussion. 166
The Supreme Court has also emphasized that, in evaluating a petitioner’s First
Amendment claims under the public forum doctrine, the court must look not just to the property
at issue but to the nature of the access sought by the petitioner. For example, in Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., the NAACP challenged its exclusion from the

162

Madison Joint Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 175-76.
Madison Joint Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 179.
164
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981)
165
See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265.
166
See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277.
163
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Combined Federal Campaign, an annual charitable fund-raising drive conducted through the
federal workplace during work hours through the voluntary efforts of public employees. 167 In
evaluating the NAACP’s claims, the Court emphasized that the access the Fund sought was not
to the federal workplace itself, but rather to participation as one of the choices in the fund-raising
drive established by the Combined Federal Campaign. 168 In Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry
Local Educators’ Ass’n, the Court examined petitioners’ request to access a public school’s
internal mail system in order to distribute literature. 169

In ruling on petitioners’ First

Amendment claim, the Court focused on the specific access sought by petitioner, which was
access to the internal mail system, not access to the public school property in general. 170
Similarly, in Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, while petitioners sought access to a public
park -- which has long been viewed as a traditional or quintessential public forum -- the nature of
the access sought by petitioners was access to install a permanent monument, instead of access
for purposes of speaking or assembly. 171
The Supreme Court has also made clear that, in order to constitute a designated public
forum, the place in which speech occurs need not be an actual physical place. Rather, the Court
has recently explained that public forums may also include virtual or "metaphysical" forums, like
funding and solicitation schemes, 172 the airwaves, 173 cable television, 174 and now, Internet

167

473 U.S. 788, 790-93 (1985).
See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801.
169
420 U.S. 546, 39 (1975)
170
460 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1983).
171
555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009).
172
See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 835
(1995)(university funding scheme for student publications constituted limited purpose designated public
forum, in which viewpoint discrimination was prohibited); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985) (Combined Federal Campaign, an annual charitable fundraising drive conducted through the federal workplace during work hours through the voluntary efforts of
public employees, was a nonpublic forum in which viewpoint discrimination was prohibited).
168

33
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249489

forums for expression as well. 175 For example, in Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the
University of Virginia, Justice Kennedy made clear that the University of Virginia's funding
scheme for student publications -- through which the university authorized the payment of
outside contractors for the printing costs of a variety of student publications -- constituted a
(limited purpose) designated public forum, within which viewpoint discrimination was
prohibited. 176
Justice Kennedy's interpretation of the public forum doctrine has been particularly
sensitive to the importance of the evolution of the doctrine in light of modern developments and
new forums for expression. His opinion in the case of International Society for Krishna
Consciousness v. Lee 177 is illustrative. In ISKCON v. Lee, members of the International Society
for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) sought to engage in their religious practice of sankirtan,
which involved “going into public places, disseminating religious literature, and soliciting funds
to support the religion.” 178 The public places the practitioners chose in which to distribute
literature and solicit funds were three major New York area airports -- Kennedy, La Guardia, and
Newark -- all of which were owned and managed by the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey (a public entity). 179 These airports and associated terminals serve as thoroughfares for

173

See, e.g., Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680 (1998) (suggesting that if
televised political debate had an “open-microphone format,” it would constitute a designated public
forum).
174
See, e.g., Denver Area Educational Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 774-75
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (public access channels, which were channels that were available at low
or no cost to members of the public, constituted designated public forums, and therefore cable operators’
speech restrictions within such forums were subject to stringent scrutiny).
175
See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (identifying cyberspace as “the most
important place[] . . . for the exchange of views”).
176
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at830 (designating the student activity fund as a forum, despite being “a
forum more in the metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense”).
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505 U.S. 672 (1992).
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Lee, 505 U.S. at 674.
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See Lee, 505 U.S. at 675-76.
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approximately 100 million passengers annually, along with other members of the public. 180 The
Port Authority adopted a regulation prohibiting both the repetitive distribution of literature and
the solicitation of funds within the airport terminals, and ISKCON sought a declaratory judgment
that the regulation violated its members’ First Amendment rights. 181
ISKCON advanced a functional interpretation of the public forum doctrine that
emphasized the historic, speech-facilitating nature of transportation nodes (like rail and bus
stations, wharves, and ports like Ellis Island), and contended that such sites historically served as
important forums for expression. 182 Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected this functional
interpretation of the doctrine in favor of a narrower reading, and concluded that, “given the
lateness with which the modern air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly qualifies for the
description [from Hague v. CIO] of having immemorially … time out of mind been held in trust
and used for purposes of expressive activity.” 183

Accordingly, Rehnquist found that airport

terminals did not constitute a traditional public forum. 184 Furthermore, according to Rehnquist,
airport terminals did not constitute “designated public forums” because the government owner
was -- as is often the case in public forum litigation -- contesting their use for expressive
purposes and could not be said to have “intentionally opened by their operators to such
[expressive] activity.” 185 In nearly every public forum case before the courts, the government
will be contesting the exercise of free speech rights on government property and will contend
that it did not take the requisite steps to create a “designated public forum.” 186
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See Lee, 505 U.S. at 675.
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 676.
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See Lee, 505 U.S. at 681.
183
Lee, 505 U.S. at 680 (internal quotations omitted).
184
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 680.
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Lee, 505 U.S. at 680
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Having concluded that the airport terminals were non-public forums, Rehnquist evaluated the Port
Authority’s ban on distribution of literature and solicitation of funds under a “reasonableness” standard,
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Justice Kennedy (writing for himself and Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Souter)
criticized Rehnquist’s miserly interpretation of the public forum doctrine, on the grounds that it
left “almost no scope for the development of new public forums absent the rare approval of the
government.” 187 Kennedy explained that the purposes of the public forum doctrine could not be
given effect unless the Court undertakes an objective, functional inquiry, based on the actual
characteristics and uses of the property. 188 Under such an inquiry, Kennedy maintained, the
Court should recognize that open public spaces and thoroughfares that are suitable for discourse,
like airport terminals, should be conceptualized as public forums, whatever their historical
pedigree. 189 Absent such a functional interpretation, Kennedy argued, the public forum doctrine
“retains no relevance in times of fast-changing technology.” 190 Rejecting the strict
“traditionality” inquiry adopted by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy instead advanced a
functional, evolving interpretation of the public forum doctrine, which took into account the fact
that airport terminals are among the few open spaces where people have extended contact with
other members of the public, and which, like streets, have areas that are “open to the public
without restriction.” 191
Justice Kennedy went on to criticize Rehnquist’s “designated public forum” analysis,
under which the government is granted the discretion to “restrict speech by fiat.” 192 Under
Rehnquist’s analysis, if the government does not expressly designate property as a public forum

under which the bans were readily upheld. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 685 (“The inconvenience to passengers
and the burdens on Port Authority officials flowing from solicitation activity may seem small, but viewed
against the fact that ‘pedestrian congestion is one of the greatest problems facing the three terminals,’ the
Port Authority could reasonably worry that even such incremental effects would prove quite disruptive.”).
187
Lee, 505 U.S. at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
188
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
189
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 697 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
190
Lee, 505 U.S. at 697 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
191
Lee, 505 U.S. at 700 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
192
Lee, 505 U.S. at 694 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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(and thereby assume the burden not to regulate speech on that property), the public enjoys no
meaningful free speech rights on such property. 193 This understanding of the “designated public
forum” doctrine would allow the government to easily evade its affirmative obligations under the
First Amendment.

Rehnquist’s failure to “recognize the possibility that new types of

government property may be appropriate forums for speech [would] lead to a serious curtailment
of our expressive activity,” 194 as Justice Kennedy explained:
[U]nder the Court's view, the authority of the government to control speech on its
property is paramount, for in almost all cases the critical step in the Court's
analysis is a classification of the property that turns on the government's own
definition or decision, unconstrained by an independent duty to respect the speech
its citizens can voice there . . . .
The Court's approach is contrary to the underlying purposes of the public forum
doctrine. The liberties protected by our doctrine . . . are essential to a functioning
democracy …. Public places are of necessity the locus for discussion of public
issues, as well as protest against arbitrary government action. At the heart of our
jurisprudence lies the principle that in a free nation citizens must have the right to
gather and speak with other persons in public places. The recognition that certain
government-owned property is a public forum provides open notice to citizens
that their freedoms may be exercised there without fear of a censorial
government, adding tangible reinforcement to the idea that we are a free people…
[T]he policies underlying the [public forum] doctrine cannot be given effect
unless we recognize that open, public spaces and thoroughfares that are suitable
for discourse may be public forums, whatever their historical pedigree and
without concern for a precise classification of the property. 195
Justice Kennedy continued to develop his evolving, functional view of the public forum
doctrine in the 1996 case of Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v.
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See Lee, 505 U.S. at 697 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The requirements for such a designation are so
stringent that I cannot be certain whether the category has any content left at all. In any event, it seems
evident that under the Court’s analysis today few, if any, types of property other than those already
recognized as public forums will be accorded that status.”).
194
Lee, 505 U.S. at 698 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Lee, 505 U.S. at 695-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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F.C.C. 196 In that case, the Court evaluated various F.C.C. orders implementing provisions of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act that governed “indecent” and
obscene programming. 197 One of the challenged F.C.C. orders permitted cable operators to
prohibit patently offensive or indecent programming on “public access channels” – channels that
were available at low or no cost to members of the public. 198 In Justice Kennedy's view, these
public access channels met the definition of a “designated public forum” – “property that the
State has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public” 199 – and therefore
government-authorized speech restrictions by cable operators within such forums were subject to
stringent scrutiny. 200 First, Kennedy explained, the nominally private ownership of these forums
(by cable operators) did not insulate them from the reach of the public forum doctrine: “[p]ublic
access channels . . . are public fora even though they operate over property to which the cable
operator holds title.” 201 Second, Kennedy explained, in providing public access channels under
their franchise agreements:
[C]able operators therefore are not exercising their own First Amendment
rights. [Rather,] [t]hey serve as conduits for the speech of others. …
Treating [public] access channels as public fora does not just place a label
on them . . . . It defines the First Amendment rights of speakers seeking to
use the channels. When property has been dedicated to public expressive
activities, by tradition or government designation, access is protected by
the First Amendment. 202
196

518 U.S. 727 (1996). In Denver Area, both the plurality (Justices Breyer, Stevens, O’Connor, and
Souter) and the dissent (Justices Thomas and Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist) refused to characterize
the forum at issue as a public forum.
197
See Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 735.
198
See Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 736.
199
Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 791 (Kennedy J., joined by Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (quoting International Soc.
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992)).
200
See Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 794 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 678)
(“Regulations of speech content in a designated public forum, whether of limited or unlimited character,
are ‘subject to the highest scrutiny’ and ‘survive only if they are narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling
state interest.’”).
201
Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 792.
202
Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 793-94.
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Justice Kennedy explained that the purpose underlying the public forum doctrine – to ensure
open, nondiscriminatory access to the means of communication – was evident in the legislation
under which the F.C.C. was regulating, and that the public forum doctrine must be meaningfully
extended to new media:
Giving Government free rein to exclude speech it dislikes ... would have
pernicious effects in the modern age. Minds are not changed in streets and
parks as they once were. To an increasing degree, the more significant
interchanges of ideas and shaping of public consciousness occur in mass
and electronic media. The extent of public entitlement to participate in
those means of communication may be changed as technologies change;
and in expanding those entitlements the Government has no greater right
to discriminate on suspect grounds than it does when it effects a ban on
speech against the backdrop of the entitlements to which we have been
more accustomed. 203

Kennedy concluded that in order for the First Amendment to remain meaningful in the modern
era, the public forum doctrine must be extended to new technologies, to prevent government (and
government-like actors operating public forums) from exercising the power to discriminate
against disfavored expression. 204
Justice Kennedy continued to develop his expansive, functional view of the public forum
doctrine in the 2017 case of Packingham v. North Carolina.205 In that case, Lester Packingham -an individual who was required to register as a sex offender after having sex with a 13 year old
girl when he was 21 -- challenged a North Carolina law that prohibited any and all use by
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Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 802-03 (citations omitted).
See Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 776-77 (“[A]s broadcast, cable, and the
cybertechnology of the Internet and the World Wide Web approach the day of using a common receiver,
we can hardly assume that standards for judging the regulation of one of them will not have immense, but
now unknown and unknowable, effects on the others.”).
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137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
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registered sex offenders of social media sites like Twitter and Facebook. 206 Packingham, in
violation of the state law, created a Facebook account using a pseudonym and posted a message
praising God and Jesus for his good fortune after a state court dismissed a traffic ticket against
him. 207 After police tracked him down and identified him as the creator of the pseudonymous
Facebook account, Packingham was convicted of felony charges for violating the state law and
given a suspended prison sentence. 208 Packingham challenged the law, claiming it violated his
First Amendment rights. 209

206

See Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1734; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. Sections 14-202.5(a) (2015) makes it a
felony for a registered sex offender to "access a commercial social networking Web site where the sex
offender knows that the site permits minor children to become members or to create or maintain person
Web pages." The statute defines "commercial social networking Web site" as a website that (1) “[i]s
operated by a person who derives revenue from membership fees, advertising, or other sources related to
the operation of the Web site”; (2) “[f]acilitates the social introduction between two or more persons for
the purposes of friendship, meeting other persons, or information exchanges” (3) “[a]llows users to create
Web pages or personal profiles that contain information such as the name or nickname of the user,
photographs placed on the personal Web page by the user, other personal information about the user, and
links to other personal Web pages on the commercial social networking Web site of friends or associates
of the user that may be accessed by other users or visitors to the Web site” and (4) “[p]rovides users or
visitors . . . mechanisms to communicate with other users, such as a message board, chat room, electronic
mail, or instant messenger.” N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. Sections 14-202.5 (b). Two exceptions to this definition
are provided. The statutory bar does not extend to websites that “[p]rovid[e] only one of the following
discrete services: photo-sharing, electronic mail, instant messenger, or chat room or message board
platform” nor to websites that have as their “primary purpose the facilitation of commercial transactions
involving goods or services between [their] members or visitors.” §14–202.5(c)(1),(2).
207

Packingham, who had created a Facebook account under the pseudonym "J.R. Gerrard," was relieved
to learn that a state court had dismissed a traffic ticket against him and in response logged onto his
Facebook page and posted the following statement:
Man God is Good! How about I got so much favor they dismissed the ticket before court
even started? No fine, no court cost, no nothing spent. . . . . . Praise be to GOD, WOW!
Thanks JESUS! Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1734.
A police officer investigating registered sex offenders who were thought to be violating the state law
prohibiting them from accessing social media discovered that a traffic citation for Packingham had been
dismissed around the time of this Facebook post. See id. The officer obtained a search warrant and
determined that Packingham was the author of the above post on Facebook, which led to Packingham's
conviction for violating the state statute. See id.
208
See Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1734.
209
See Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1734.
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Justice Kennedy, in the Opinion of the Court, struck down the state law's broad
prohibition on access to social media sites by registered sex offenders, explaining that social
media sites like Facebook and Twitter serve important free speech functions and that prohibiting
registered sex offenders (of whom there were 20,000 in the state, whose status as sex offenders
could endure for 30 years or more) impermissibly thwarted those important free speech
functions. 210 Kennedy focused in particular on the important functions served by the public
forum doctrine, explaining that: “A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all
persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak
and listen once more.” 211 Kennedy noted that streets and parks were the "quintessential forum[s]
for the exercise of First Amendment rights" and that such traditional public forums -- even in the
modern age -- are still essential venues for citizens to exercise these rights -- for "public
gatherings to celebrate some views, to protest others, or simply to learn and inquire." 212 He
acknowledged that the Court had some difficulty in the past determining which venues beyond
streets, sidewalks, and parks should be considered public forums, but that the emergence of the
Internet in general and social media on the Internet in particular simplified such inquiries:
"While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places… for
the exchange of views, today the answer is clear... It is cyberspace – the ‘vast democratic forums
of the Internet’ in general, and social media in particular.” 213 Kennedy went on to identify
Facebook and Twitter as the most significant social media forums, and characterized Twitter in
particular as a forum where "users can petition their elected representatives and otherwise engage
with them in a direct manner," since "Governors of all 50 States and almost every Member of
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Congress" employ Twitter as a forum in which to engage with constituents. 214 Kennedy noted
that, as with traditional public forums of streets, sidewalks, and parks, social media sites offer
"relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds," where users can
"engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity on topics ‘as diverse as human
thought.’" 215 Social media, Kennedy explained, "allows users to gain access to information and
communicate with one another about it on any subject that might come to mind... [and constitute]
principal sources for knowing current events, ... speaking and listening in the modern public
square, ... exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge, . . . [and are] the most
powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard." 216 In
summary, Kennedy observed that the Internet in general and social media in particular have "vast
potential to alter how we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be." 217 In light of
the important role social media serve in advancing free speech values, the Court held that the
state law's sweeping ban on registered sex offenders' access to social media -- forums that are
"integral to the fabric of modern society and culture" -- could not withstand constitutional
scrutiny. 218
B. Public Forums on Privately-Owned Property
Although public forums generally involve government-owned property, the Court has
made clear that, in order to constitute a public forum, the space at issue need not be owned by the
government; rather, a public forum can exist where the underlying property is privately-owned
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but controlled by the government. 219 If the government seeks to regulate private property that it
has opened up and designated for use as a public forum, then such regulation must be consistent
with the strictures of the First Amendment and with the strictures of the public forum doctrine in
particular. For example, in Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, the Court held that a privatelyowned theatre under long-term lease to the city of Chattanooga that was “designed for and
dedicated to expressive activities” 220 would be considered a designated public forum and
therefore the City could not censor the production of the musical “Hair” based on disapproval of
its content. 221 Similarly, in Denver Area, Justice Kennedy explained in his concurring opinion
that privately-owned cable stations that were controlled by the government and opened up by the
government for use by the public constituted designated public forums in which government
regulation was subject to strict scrutiny. 222 As discussed above, Denver Area involved various
Federal Communications Commission orders implementing provisions of the 1984 Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act that governed “indecent” and obscene
programming, one of which permitted cable operators to prohibit patently offensive or indecent

219

Indeed, the Supreme Court indicated in the seminal public forum case of Hague v. CIO that the public
or private ownership of the property under consideration was not dispositive of the issue of whether the
property was a public forum. See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). In that
case the Court, explained that “[w]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public, and time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. . . . [and
accordingly, the] privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication
of views on national questions . . . must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.” Id.
(emphasis added).
220
420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975). See also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Edu. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,
8011985) (In order to invoke the public forum doctrine, “a speaker must seek access to public property or
to private property dedicated to public use to evoke First Amendment concerns.”) (emphasis added).
221
See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd, 420 U.S. at 555 (unconstitutional for municipal board of City of
Chattanooga to reject petition to stage the musical “Hair” at a city-leased theater on the grounds that the
production would not be “in the best interest of the community,” because theater was a designated public
forum, notwithstanding the fact that the theater was privately owned, and because rejection constituted
prior restraint on protected speech without adequate substantive and procedural safeguards.)
222
See Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 774 (1996) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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programming on public access channels. 223 Those defending the constitutionality of the Act’s
provisions argued that the public forum doctrine was not implicated by the Act’s prohibitions,
because the conduits for speech at issue were privately owned and because this order merely
enabled private cable operators to implement speech restrictions, and therefore that the First
Amendment was not implicated. 224 Kennedy rejected both arguments. First, Kennedy explained
that the Act imposed impermissible content-based restrictions within a designated public forum - notwithstanding the fact that the restrictions would be imposed by private cable operators.
Kennedy explained:
The public access channels . . . are available at low or no cost to members of the public,
often on a first-come, first-served basis. . . Public access channels meet the definition of a
public forum. We have recognized two kinds of public fora. The first and most familiar
are traditional public fora, like streets, sidewalks, and parks, which by custom have long
been open for public assembly and discourse. . . . The second category of public property
is the designated public forum, whether of a limited or unlimited character -- property
that the State has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public. . .
Public access channels fall in the second category. Required by the franchise authority as
a condition of the franchise and open to all comers, [public access channels] are a
designated public forum of unlimited character. The House Report for the 1984 Cable
Act ... characterized public access channels as "the video equivalent of the speaker's soap
box or the electronic parallel to the printed leaflet. They provide groups and individuals
who generally have not had access to the electronic media with the opportunity to
become sources of information in the electronic marketplace of ideas." . . . Public fora do
not have to be physical gathering places, ... nor are they limited to property owned by the
government... Indeed, in the majority of jurisdictions, title to some of the most traditional
of public fora, streets and sidewalks, remains in private hands....Public access channels
are analogous; they are public fora even though they operate over property to which the
cable operator holds title.... 225
Kennedy went on to reject the argument that the Act would merely require private property
owners (the cable operators) to implement the speech restrictions of their choosing and were
merely exercising their own First Amendment rights: “In providing public access channels under
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their franchise agreements, cable operators ... are not exercising their own First Amendment
rights. [Rather, cable operators] serve as conduits for the speech of others. ... By enacting a law
in 1992 excluding indecent programming from protection ..., the Federal Government at the
same time ratified the public forum character of public access channels but discriminated against
certain speech based on its content.” 226 Accordingly, Kennedy made clear that government
restrictions imposed on privately-owned property can constitute impermissible speech
restrictions within a designated public forum, regardless of the fact that the forum was privately
owned.
In summary, from its initial inception in the mid-twentieth century to its complex
development and evolution over the next century, the public forum doctrine has expanded to
encompass not just physical property owned by the government, but also "metaphysical" forums
-- including Internet forums -- that are owned or controlled by government officials. As a result
of this evolution, the public forum doctrine continues to be a vibrant and essential doctrine for
the protection of speech against censorship by government officials in new mediums opened up
by government officials for expressive purposes.
C. The Government Speech Doctrine: Distinguishing "Government Speech" from Public
Forums for Private Speech
In several recent cases, the Supreme Court has distinguished situations in which the
government has established public forums for speech -- in which individuals enjoy the robust
protections of the public forum doctrine -- from situations in which only the government itself is
speaking -- in which the protections of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment do not
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apply. In a line of cases beginning with Rust v. Sullivan 227 in 1991, the Court has made clear that
when the government itself, or government officials, are speaking, the mandates of the public
forum doctrine -- including the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination by the government - do not apply. The Court has since expanded the category of government speech -- in which
viewpoint discrimination by the government is permitted -- to include cases in which the
government itself is the speaker as well as instances in which the government is using private
speakers to transmit its own message. 228
The distinction between cases in which the government is speaking and cases in which it
is creating a public forum for the speech of others is not always a clear one, as is seen in cases
like Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, which involved government restrictions on a private
organization's requested access to a public park. 229 In that case, a religious organization called
Summum sought to erect a stone monument in Pioneer Park, a public park in Pleasant Grove
City, Utah. The monument that the Summum organization sought to erect in the park contained
227

500 U.S. 173 (1991). Rust v. Sullivan involved a challenge to a set of 1988 regulations issued under
Title X of the Public Health Service Act of 1970, which prohibited Title X project grantees from, inter
alia, providing counseling concerning the use of abortion or providing referral for abortion as a method of
family planning, even upon request from patients. See id. at 179. These regulations were challenged by
Title X grantees, who claimed that the regulation’s “gag rule” violated their First Amendment rights and
amounted to illegal viewpoint discrimination within a designated public forum. See id. at 181. The Court,
in a 5-4 opinion, upheld the regulations and held that the government could constitutionally decide to
“selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without
at the same time funding an alternate program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.” Id.
at 193. Although the Court did not at the time characterize Rust as a case involving government speech, in
subsequent cases the Court explained that “the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X
amounted to government speech” and held that “viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in
instances in which the government is itself the speaker or instances, like Rust, in which the government
used private speakers to transmit information pertaining to its own program.” See Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001).
228
See Legal Services Corp., 531 U.S. at 541 (explaining that "viewpoint-based funding decisions can be
sustained in instances in which the government is itself the speaker or ... in which the government used
private speakers to transmit information pertaining to its own program" and stating that "when the
government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take
legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the
grantee.")
229
555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009).
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the Seven Aphorisms of Summum, which the organization believes were inscribed on the tablet
that God handed down to Moses on Mount Sinai. At the time of Summum's request to install the
monument, Pioneer Park contained fifteen monuments, eleven of which had been donated by
private organizations, including a Ten Commandments monument that had been donated by the
Fraternal Order of Eagles. The City of Pleasant Grove refused to allow Summum to erect its
desired monument in the park, and Summum sued, claiming that the City's actions -- by
accepting other donated monuments while refusing Summum's proffered donation -- constituted
illegal viewpoint discrimination within a public forum. 230
The lower court analyzed Summum's request for access to the public park under the
public forum doctrine and found for Summum. 231 The Supreme Court, however, unanimously
ruled in favor of the City and held that forum analysis was inappropriate. 232 The Court held that,
in deciding which permanent monuments were to be displayed on public property, the
government was engaging in government speech, and was not impermissibly discriminating on
the basis of viewpoint within a public forum for private speech. 233 While acknowledging that
public parks are traditional public forums to which individuals have a right of access for
purposes such as delivering speeches and holding marches and demonstrations, the Court
explained that forum analysis did not apply to the specific type of access sought here -- the
erection of a permanent monument in the public park. 234 The Court indicated that the relevant
inquiry involved whether the forum could accommodate the types of requests for access from
private parties at issue, and concluded that it could not:
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See Summum, 555 U.S. at 466.
See Summum, 555 U.S. at 464.
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See Summum, 555 U.S. at 481
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See Summum, 555 U.S. at 466.
231

47
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249489

The forum doctrine has been applied in situations in which governmentowned property or a government program was capable of accommodating
a large number of public speakers without defeating the essential function
of the land or the program. For example, a park can accommodate many
speakers and, over time, many parades and demonstrations....By contrast,
public parks can accommodate only a limited number of permanent
monuments . . . It is hard to imagine how a public park could be opened
for the installation of permanent monuments by every person or group
wishing to engage in that form of expression. . . [Indeed,] if public parks
were considered to be traditional public forums for the purpose of erecting
privately donated monuments, most parks would have little choice but to
refuse all such donations ... and application of forum analysis would lead
almost inexorably to the closing of the forum. 235
Holding that the selection of which permanent monuments to allow in a public park constituted
government speech, the Court concluded that the City's selection decision was not subject to
scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause. 236
The Court adopted a similar approach in analyzing a state program for specialty license
plates in the recent case of Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans. 237 In Walker,
the Sons of Confederate Veterans -- a non-profit organization that works to preserve the memory
and reputation of soldiers who fought for the confederacy in the Civil War -- applied to have a
new specialty license plate recognized and issued by the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles
(TDMV). 238 The Sons of Confederate Veterans sought approval for its specialty license plate
design that featured the Confederate battle flag. 239 The Texas Department of Motor Vehicles had
a policy stating that it "may refuse to create a new specialty license plate if the design might be
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Summum, 555 U.S. at 478-80.
See Summum, 555 U.S. at 481. The Court explained, “the City’s decision to accept certain privately
donated monuments while rejecting [Summum’s] is best viewed as a form of government speech. As a
result, the City’s decision is not subject to the Free Speech Clause . . . .” Id. at 481. The Court held,
however, that the City's decisions must comply with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
237
135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
238
See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245.
239
See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245.
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offensive to any member of the public." 240 Although hundreds of other specialty license plates
had been approved by Department -- including a "Buffalo Soldiers" license plate that certain
Native Americans objected to, on the grounds that it was offensive to them -- the Department
refused to approve the Sons of Confederate Veterans proposed plate on the ground that it was
potentially offensive to others. 241 The Sons of the Confederate Veterans organization sued the
state, claiming that the state had opened up a public forum for speech when it created the
specialty license plate program and when the Department thereafter approved hundreds of other
plates with a variety of messages (some of which were offensive to some groups). 242
The Supreme Court disagreed. 243 Relying heavily on its Pleasant Grove v. Summum
decision, the Court in a 5-4 decision concluded that the state's specialty license plate program
constituted government speech and therefore that government decisions in selecting which plates
to approve and which to reject did not create a public forum for speech (and need not be
viewpoint neutral). 244 In adopting the government speech framework, the Court primarily looked
to three factors. First, the Court explained that license plates, like permanent monuments in
public parks, "long have communicated messages from the States." 245 Second, the Court
explained that license plates, like permanent monuments in public parks, are "often closely
identified in the public mind with the [State]" since they serve as a form of a government ID,
notwithstanding the fact that private parties were involved in the creation of the specialty license
plate messages. 246 Third, the Court observed that the state maintained direct control over the
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Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2244-45.
See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2258, 2245.
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See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245.
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See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250.
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See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246.
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Walker, 135 S. Ct. at2248
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Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248.
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messages conveyed on its specialty license plates. 247 In the majority's view, all three factors
pointed to the conclusion that the messages on the specialty license plates constituted
government speech, not private speech within a designated public forum opened up by the
government, and therefore that the strictures of the Free Speech Clause did not apply. 248 The
four dissenting Justices criticized the majority's decision and warned that the government speech
doctrine, if applied too broadly, could swallow up the First Amendment's crucial protections for
unpopular speech. 249
In subsequent cases, the Court has made clear that the Walker decision constituted the
outer limits of the government speech doctrine and re-emphasized the dangers to free speech in
applying the government speech doctrine too broadly. In the recent case of Matal v. Tam, which
involved the United States Trademark Office’s refusal to register the mark “The Slants” for an
Asian-American rock band on the principal register on the grounds that the mark was likely to be
disparaging toward persons of Asian descent, in violation of the Disparagement Clause of the

247

See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249.
See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249. The Court emphasized that the Establishment Clause was still relevant
in analyzing whether government speech ran afoul of the First Amendment, for example, in cases where
the government adopted a religious message on a specialty license plate.
249
See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2254 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito criticized the majority’s
characterization of the state specialty license plate program as government speech instead of a limited
public forum and claimed that the majority’s approach severely limited the First Amendment’s
protections for unpopular viewpoints:
248

The Court’s decision passes off private speech as government speech and, in doing so, establishes
a precedent that threatens private speech that government finds displeasing. Under our First
Amendment cases, the distinction between government speech and private speech is critical. The
First Amendment does not regulate government speech, and therefore when government speaks,
it is free to select the views that it wants to express.... By contrast, in the realm of private speech
or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over another.... Unfortunately,
the Court’s decision categorizes private speech as government speech and thus strips it of all First
Amendment protection.... This capacious understanding of government speech takes a large and
painful bite out of the First Amendment. Id. at 2254-55 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted,
internal quotation marks omitted).
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Lanham Act, 250 the Trademark Office argued that its selection of which marks to register and
which to refuse constituted government speech, not private speech, and therefore its selection
decisions were not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause. 251 The Supreme Court
unanimously rejected the government’s attempt to extend the government speech doctrine to this
context, and held that the Trademark Office’s refusal to register the mark at issue amounted to
illegal viewpoint discrimination against private speech, not government speech that was immune
from scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause. 252 In so doing, the Court cautioned against the
government's proposed “huge and dangerous” expansion of the government speech doctrine: 253
[W]hile the government-speech doctrine is important—indeed, essential—it is a
doctrine that is susceptible to dangerous misuse. If private speech could be passed
off as government speech by simply affixing a government seal of approval,
government could silence or muffle the expression of disfavored viewpoints. For
this reason, we must exercise great caution before extending our governmentspeech precedents. 254
III. Forum Analysis of Government Officials' Blocking Constituents from Accessing Their
Social Media Sites
A. Introduction
Having explored the contours of the modern public forum doctrine and the government
speech doctrine, in this Part, I turn to an analysis of the actions of government officials in
blocking their constituents from accessing their social media accounts. In both the case
250

See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). The Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act of
1946 prohibits the registration on the Principal Register of trademarks that “consists of or comprises
immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection
with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or
disrepute.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
251
See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1757.
252
See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1760.
253
Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1760 (“For if the registration of trademarks constituted government speech, other
systems of government registration could easily be characterized in the same way.”). See also Steven G.
Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech When the Government Has Nothing
to Say?, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1259, 1311 (2010) (claiming that courts must “restrict the application of the
government speech doctrine to situations where the exercise of free speech rights by private citizens
would thwart the government’s ability to communicate with the public”).
254
Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1758.
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involving Loudoun County Commissioner Randall and the case involving Maryland Governor
Hogan, constituents were blocked from commenting on the government officials' Facebook
page. 255 In Hogan's case, his constituents were blocked pursuant to an official government social
media policy, which provided that his Facebook page was established to serve as a "forum for
constructive and respectful discussion with and among users" and that constituents' comments on
Hogan's Facebook page could be deleted "at any time . . . without providing justification." 256
Pursuant to this policy, as discussed above, Hogan and his administration blocked constituents
from commenting on his Facebook page after they questioned or criticized his policies. 257 In the
Virginia case, Loudoun County Commissioner Phyllis Randall operated an unofficial Facebook
page and made a unilateral decision to block her constituent's comment (not pursuant to a
government social media policy). 258 In both cases, constituents were blocked and their comments
were removed because of the government official's disagreement with the viewpoint expressed
by the constituent. The Maryland case, in which the American Civil Liberties Union challenged
the blocking of constituents pursuant to the Governor's social media policy, was settled, with the
Hogan administration agreeing to modify its social media policy to comply with the dictates of
the First Amendment. 259 The Virginia case is ongoing, as I discuss below.
B. County Commissioner Randall’s Unofficial Facebook Page as Public Forum: Davison v.
Loudoun County Board of Supervisors
255

See discussion supra.
Exhibit A to Complaint, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017)
257
See Complaint at 3, Laurenson et al. v. Hogan, No. 8:17 Civ. 02162-DKC (filed on Aug. 1, 2017)
258
See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 715 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017)
259
See Laurenson v. Hogan, ACLU MARYLAND, https://www.aclu-md.org/en/cases/laurenson-v-hogan
(last visited July 28, 2018) (“The ACLU reached a settlement in the case that includes a new social media
policy that will govern Gov. Hogan's Facebook page, mandates the creation of a second Facebook page
dedicated to providing a public forum where constituents can raise a host of issues for the governor's
attention, and creates an appeals process for constituents who feel their comments have been improperly
deleted, or that they have been wrongfully blocked.”). See generally Office of the Governor Social-Media
Policy, Office of Governor Larry Hogan,http://governor.maryland.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/social-media-policy.pdf (last visited July 28, 2018).
256
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In Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors, the parties primarily dispute
whether the unofficial Facebook page of Chair Phyllis Randall -- from which constituent Brian
Davison was blocked after he posted a critical comment -- constituted a public forum for
purposes of the First Amendment. 260 Randall argues that, in creating her unofficial Facebook
page, she did not create a public forum for the private speech of others. 261 She maintains instead
that the Facebook page is her own private speech forum -- on which she cannot be compelled to
adopt someone else's comments -- or, in the alternative, that her Facebook page is government
speech, which is immune from scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause. 262 Randall argues further
that the public forum doctrine is inapplicable because Facebook is a private entity. 263 She
maintains that the public forum doctrine is only applicable to publicly-owned property and
cannot properly be invoked in the context of a privately-owned website like Facebook. 264
Adverting to the fact that Facebook has its own content removal guidelines and its own First
Amendment rights at stake, Randall maintains that her decision to block access to her page on
this privately-owned forum does not implicate the public forum doctrine. 265 In response, her
blocked constituent Davison argues that, despite the fact that Randall's Facebook page is
unofficial, it nonetheless constitutes a government-run and government-controlled forum, on
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See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 711 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017).
See Defendant-Appellant Phyllis J. Randall's Informal Opening Brief at 7, Davison v. Loudoun Cnty.
Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017).
262
See id. at 7-10.
263
See id. at 8.
264
See id. at 7.
265
See id. at 8. See also Defendants Loudoun County Board of Supervisors and Phyllis Randall's
Memorandum In Support of Motion For Summary Judgment Filed Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) at 17,
Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, (E.D. Va. 2017) (No. 1:16 Civ.
00932) (“Facebook . . . retains control of Facebook page content by imposing specific terms and
conditions . . .As conceded by Davison, due to Facebook’s internal software, anyone can mark his
postings as span which would cause Facebook to suppress his comments, without any action taken by the
government . . . It is Facebook’s created software which allows this to occur and to which Davison
objects . . . .”).
261
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which Randall expressly invited constituents to comment on any and all manner of subjects, and
that Commissioner Randall thereby created a designated public forum, within which viewpoint
discrimination is impermissible. 266
The district court in Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors properly rejected
Randall's argument that her Facebook page was her personal/private speech, as well as her
argument in the alternative that the page constituted government speech immune from public
forum analysis. First, in analyzing whether Randall's Facebook page was personal or
governmental, the district court looked to whether her actions in connection with the page had a
sufficiently close nexus with the state such as to be fairly treated as the actions of the
government itself, considering the totality of the relevant circumstances. 267 The district court
observed, on the one hand, that certain facts weighed in favor of considering the Facebook page
as Randall’s private speech. 268 Randall's official duties as County Commissioner do not include
the maintenance of a social media site, and Randall's Facebook page will not revert to the county
government when Randall leaves office. 269 Further, Randall does not use government-issued
electronic devices to maintain her Facebook page, and much of her Facebook activity generally
takes place outside of her physical government office and outside of her official working
hours. 270 However, the district court was more persuaded by the factors weighing in favor of
considering Randall's Facebook page to be governmental and having a sufficiently close nexus
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See Second Amended Complaint at 8, Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d
702 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017).
267
See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 720 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017)
(“[T]his case concerns apparently private actions that have a sufficiently close nexus with the State to be
fairly treated as the actions of the State itself.”) (internal quotations omitted).
268
See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 712 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017).
269
See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 712 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017).
270
See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 712 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017).
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with the state. 271 First, and most importantly, Randall used her Facebook page as a tool of
governance and as a vehicle to engage with her constituents with respect to her official
government activities. 272 She expressly requested that her citizens use her Facebook page as a
channel for "back and forth constituent conversations" with her, and the content on her page is
predominantly related to her official government actions and duties. 273 In addition, her
Facebook page has been designated in many ways as governmental not personal. 274 The title of
the page includes Randall's governmental title, the page is designated as that of a government
official, and lists Randall's official email address, telephone number, and web address. 275
Furthermore, Randall's motivation for banning Davison from her Facebook page was because he
criticized her colleagues in county government. 276 The district court found that this censorial
motive related to the conduct of Randall's official government duties. 277 In considering the
totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that Randall's operation of her Facebook page
was governmental -- not private -- action.

278

Next, the district court properly rejected Randall's argument that her Facebook page
constituted government speech that was immune from scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause. 279
Finally, the district court concluded, based on the multifactor designated public forum analysis,
that the page constituted a designated public forum for expression. 280 The court observed that the
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See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 713 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017)
(describing Randall’s actions as arising “out of public, not personal, circumstances”).
272
See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 713 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017).
273
See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 713 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017).
274
See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 714 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017).
275
See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 714 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017).
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See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 714 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017).
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See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 714 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017).
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See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 714 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017).
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See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 714-18 (E.D. Va. May 10,
2017).
280
See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 718 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017).
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government may open a forum for speech by creating a website in which private viewers could
"express opinions or post information” or otherwise where the government “invite[s] or allow[s]
private persons to publish information or their positions.” 281 Referring to the facts and
circumstances surrounding the creation of Randall's Facebook page, the district court found that
Randalls had done just that. 282 Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Packingham v. North
Carolina, the district court held that "[w]hen one creates a Facebook page, one generally opens a
digital space for the exchange of ideas and information." 283 The court noted that Randall
explicitly allowed and invited public comment on her Facebook page when she expressly
solicited comments from her constituents by stating: "Everyone, could you do me a favor. I
really want to hear from ANY Loudoun citizen on ANY issues, request, criticism, compliment,
or just your thoughts." 284 Specifically, Commissioner Randall invited her constituents to initiate
and engage in "back and forth conversations" with her on "ANY issues" on the page. 285 The
court properly held that this language and this open invitation constituted the “designation of a
place or channel of communication for use by the public,” which created a public forum for
speech. 286 Because Randall "allowed virtually unfettered discussion” and “affirmatively
solicited comments from her constituents” on her Facebook page, Randall created a public forum
for private speech that was subject to the strictures of the First Amendment. 287 Accordingly,
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Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017)
(quoting Page v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 284 (4th Cir. 2008)).
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See Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017).
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(citing Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017)).
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Randall’s actions of deleting Davison’s comments because of her disagreement with him
constituted illegal viewpoint discrimination within a public forum. 288
C. The President’s Twitter Account as Public Forum: Knight Institute v. Donald J. Trump
In Knight Institute v. Trump, seven individuals who were blocked from following the
president on his Twitter account sued the president and other responsible government officials,
claiming that their First Amendment rights were violated by these actions. 289 In this case, the
parties dispute whether the interactive space within Trump’s @realDonaldTrump Twitter
account constitutes a public forum within which viewpoint discrimination is illegal. 290 The
Knight First Amendment Institute, which represents seven individuals who were blocked by
Trump from following him on his @RDT Twitter account, contends that the @RDT account
constitutes state action, not Trump’s private action; that such state action does not constitute
government speech that is immune from analysis under the Free Speech Clause, but rather that
the interactive space associated with this account constitutes a designated public forum within
which viewpoint discrimination is prohibited. 291 President Trump and the other named
defendants, on the other hand, argue that his @RDT account constitutes his private speech, so he
is entitled to say what he wants and to block whatever comments he wants; that it is Twitter, a
private company, not Trump, that enables the blocking of certain individuals from the president’s
account; and that if, in the alternative, the account constitutes state action not private action, his
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Davison v. Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017).
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 549 (S.D.N.Y.
2018).
290
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 564 (S.D.N.Y.
2018).
291
See Cross-Motion of Plaintiff for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 12-21, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp.
3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205).
289
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account constitutes government speech that is immune from analysis under the Free Speech
Clause (and the public forum doctrine). 292 I explore each of these claims in detail below.
Both sides in the Trump/Twitter case agree that the 140 (now 280) characters that make
up each presidential tweet from the @realDonaldTrump account constitute private speech in
which the president enjoys his own First Amendment rights to say what he wants and that the
president is constitutionally permitted to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in composing his
tweets. 293 And plaintiffs do not seek to regulate the content or viewpoint of the tweets
themselves. 294 The disputed issue is not with the tweets themselves; rather, it involves the
interactive space associated within the president’s Twitter account, the space that allows Twitter
users to interact with the president and with one another in relation to the president's tweets. 295
As both sides stipulate, “Twitter is called a ‘social’ media platform in large part because of
comment threads, which reflect multiple overlapping ‘conversations’ among and across groups
of users.” 296 Plaintiffs claim that they have a right to access -- and to not be blocked on the basis
of viewpoint from accessing -- this interactive space, because this interactive space constitutes a
292

See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 10-22, Knight First Amendment Inst. at
Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). The defendants
also contend that the Knight Institute does not have standing to bring the lawsuit, because it has not
suffered a concrete and particularized injury in fact that can be traced to the challenged actions of the
president, and that the court cannot issue equitable relief against the president. See id. at 5-7. See also
Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 563-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(rejecting challenges to the Knight Institute’s standing)
293
See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 14, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205); Cross-Motion of Plaintiff
for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 26, Knight First
Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ.
05205).
294
See Cross-Motion of Plaintiff for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 26, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d
541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205) (“The mere fact that @realDonaldTrump’s tweets constitute
government speech does not mean that the comment threads associated with is tweets are something other
than a public forum.”).
295
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 556 (S.D.N.Y.
2018).
296
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at551 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
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government-controlled, designated public forum for speech, in which viewpoint discrimination is
prohibited. 297
Accordingly, the central issue in the Trump/Twitter case is whether the interactive space
associated with the president’s @RDT Twitter account constitutes a designated public forum in
which viewpoint discrimination is prohibited. 298 Trump and the other defendants argue that the
interactive space associated with Trump’s account constitutes private action, not state action. 299
As County Commission Randall argued in her case, defendants in the Trump/Twitter case argue
that the president’s operation of his social media account is not action that is traceable to his
official powers because: he does not operate the account by virtue of federal law; his use of the
account is not a right conferred by the presidency; and this account itself was created before he
became president. 300 Defendants contend that decisions regarding which voices to allow in the
interactive space associated with the president’s Twitter account are similar to the president’s
decisions regarding whom to interact with in real space, which is a matter of private action not
state action. 301 Defendants contend further that the power to block constituents from the
interactive space associated with the president’s Twitter account was granted and enabled by
Twitter (a private entity) and is governed by Twitter’s structural rules and regulations, not by the

297

See Cross-Motion of Plaintiff for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 22, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d
541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205).
298
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 556.
299
See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 11, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205) (“[T]he President’s use of
his personal Twitter account is among the ‘acts of officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits [that] are
plainly excluded’ from state action.”) (quoting Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1994)).
300
See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 12, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205).
301
See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 13, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205) (analogizing what Trump’s
choice of what Twitter accounts to follow and block to Trump’s decision of “what newspapers to pick up
[and] what news programs to watch”).
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president. 302 Accordingly, defendants claim that decisions regarding the contours of and access
to the interactive space associated with the president’s Twitter account are the result of private
actions -- the action of Donald J. Trump not clothed in the official powers of the presidency and
the action of Twitter, a private company, in creating the ability to block individuals from one’s
Twitter account. 303
Furthermore, defendants argue, in the alternative, that if the decisions regarding the
contours of the interactive space associated with @realDonaldTrump are not considered private
speech, they should be considered government speech, which is immune from analysis under the
Free Speech Clause and under the public forum doctrine. 304 Defendants compare the president’s
decisions regarding who is allowed to follow him to the government’s decisions in Pleasant
Grove v. Summum regarding which privately donated monuments to allow in a public park. 305
As in Summum, discussed above, defendants argue that the president’s choices regarding
conversations in response to his tweets constitute government speech. 306
Finally, defendants argue that the interactive space associated with Trump’s Twitter
account is not a public forum because it is property controlled by Twitter, a private company, not
property that is owned and controlled by the government. They further claim that Trump has not
intentionally opened up this space for public discourse, as is necessary to create a designated

302

See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 13, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205)
303
See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 12, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205)
304
See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 15, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205)
305
See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 15, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205)
306
See discussion supra.
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public forum. 307 Rather, defendants argue, Trump’s Twitter account and the interactive space
associated with it is merely the speech of the president participating in a privately run and
privately controlled forum, which is not susceptible to analysis under the public forum
doctrine. 308
In Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump, the district court began its examination of
the plaintiffs’ public forum claims and defendant's defenses, consistent with the Supreme Court's
teachings on the subject, by focusing on the nature of the access sought by plaintiffs and the type
of space to which they sought access. 309 The court explained that in order to analyze plaintiffs’
public forum claims, it must begin by focusing on the access sought by the speakers. 310 The court
found that the access sought by the Trump/Twitter plaintiffs was narrow and specific in scope,
similar to the access sought by the plaintiffs in the Cornelius v. NAACP 311 and Perry Education
Association 312 public forum cases, discussed above. 313 In particular, the access sought by the
Trump/Twitter plaintiffs was not the right to access the president’s @RDT Twitter account as a
whole, which would include the right to decide the content of the president’s tweets 314 and/or the
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See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 12, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205)
308
See Motion of Government for Summary Judgment at 13, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205)
309
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 565.
310
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 565.
311
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Edu. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 793 (1985) (addressing access to the
Combined Federal Campaign).
312
See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 39 (1983) (addressing access to
the interschool mail system and teacher mailboxes in the Perry Township schools).
313
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566.
314
The court explained, not surprisingly, that the content of each tweet from the @RDT twitter account
fell comfortably within the category of government speech, since these tweets consist solely of the speech
of the president or other government officials who help him craft such tweets. See Knight First
Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 571. However, the court went on to determine
that the same could not be said of the interactive space for replies and retweets associated with each tweet
sent from the @RDT account, as discussed infra. See id. at 572.
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right to decide whom the president follows on his @RDT Twitter account. 315 Rather, the access
the Trump/Twitter plaintiffs sought was the narrow and specific right to express themselves
within the interactive space associated with each of the president’s tweets by replying to,
retweeting, and/or liking those tweets and otherwise participating in the account's interactive
space -- the right that is enjoyed by the 53 million other individuals who follow the president on
his @RDT Twitter account. 316 Thus, the court appropriately narrowed the relevant inquiry and
found that the proper subject of the forum analysis was not the @RDT Twitter account as a
whole but the interactive space associated with each of the president’s tweets from this account - the space that allows for the president’s 53 million Twitter followers to engage and interact
with, comment on, praise, criticize, expound upon, and accept or reject the statements made by
the president. 317
The court then examined whether this specific forum -- the interactive space associated
with each of the president’s tweets from his @RDT account -- constituted a forum that was
government-controlled. 318 The judge rejected at the outset the arguments advanced by Trump -that because the underlying forum was owned by Twitter, a private company, and was not a
physical place, it did not constitute a public forum for purposes of First Amendment analysis. 319
While recognizing that many of the Supreme Court’s public forum cases involve governmentowned physical property like streets, parks, and public school facilities, the court explained that
public forums have also been recognized in cases where the forum at issue was owned by private

315

See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 565.
See Complaint at 25, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17 Civ. 05205). See also Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump.
317
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566.
318
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566-70.
319
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566.
316

62
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249489

entities but controlled by the government. 320 As discussed above, 321 in cases like Southeastern
Promotions v. Conrad, the Supreme Court found that a privately-owned theater space to which
access was controlled by the government constituted a public forum, notwithstanding the fact
that the city did not own the forum for expression at issue. 322 The judge correctly held that the
underlying form of ownership of the forum is not dispositive; 323 rather, the relevant inquiry
concerns the entity that is exercising control over access to the forum. 324 In addition, the court
explained that it was irrelevant that the forum under consideration (the interactive space
associated with Trump's Twitter account) did not have a physical situs, as the Supreme Court has
repeatedly explained that a public forum may “lack a physical situs” 325 and may be “a forum
more in the metaphysical sense than in a spatial or geographic sense.” 326 The court held that the
non-physical forum at issue in the Trump/Twitter case was one that was governmentcontrolled. 327 While recognizing that Twitter controls the basic features of the Twitter platform,
the court found that it was Trump (and government officials working under his direction) who
320

See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566.
See text accompanying notes x - y.
322
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566 (using examples of
privately-owned public forums) (citing Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975)).
323
It is worthwhile to recall language from the Supreme Court’s seminal public forum case, in which it
instructed that the issue of who held formal title to the property at issue was not dispositive: “Wherever
the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public,
and time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. [Therefore,] the privilege of a citizen of the United States to use
the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions . . . must not, in the guise of
regulation, be abridged or denied.” Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939)
(emphasis added).
324
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566 (“This requirement of
governmental control, rather than complete governmental ownership, is . . . consistent with forum
analysis's focus on ‘the extent to which the Government can control access’ to the space and whether that
control comports with the First Amendment”) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Edu. Fund,
473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
325
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566 (quoting Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 801).
326
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566 (quoting Rosenberger,
515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995)).
327
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566.
321
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exercises control over access to the specific forum at issue in this case, including which of the 53
million individuals who follow Trump’s account will be blocked from further participation in the
interactive space associated with the president’s tweets. 328
The central issue that the court next considered was whether the government-controlled
forum at issue -- the interactive space associated with each of the president’s tweets from his
@RDT twitter account -- was subject to forum analysis under the First Amendment or instead
constituted government speech that was immune from forum analysis under the First
Amendment. 329 In analyzing this crucial government speech versus forum analysis issue, the
court turned to the central cases of Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 330 Walker v. Sons of the
Confederate Veterans, 331 and Matal v. Tam, 332 in which the Supreme Court found the following
factors to be most relevant to resolving this issue: (1) whether the forum was constrained by
inherent selectivity and scarcity, including whether a public forum classification would “lead
almost inexorably to the closing of the forum” 333 or whether the forum was “capable of
accommodating a large [amount of speech] without defeating its essential function” 334; (2)
whether the speech within the forum was closely identified in the public mind with the

328

See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566-67 (“[T]hey control the
content of the tweets. . . and they hold the ability to prevent, through blocking, other Twitter users . . .
from accessing the @realDonaldTrump account . . . .”).
329
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 570.
330
555 U.S. 460 (2009).
331
135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
332
137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
333
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 571 (quoting Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 480 (2009)).
334
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 570 (quoting Summum, 555
U.S. at 478).
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government; 335 and (3) whether the government maintained control over the speech in the
forum. 336
Applying the first factor -- whether the forum was constrained by inherent selectivity and
scarcity -- the court properly held that the forum composed of the interactive space associated
with each presidential tweet was not characterized by inherent selectivity and scarcity. 337 This
forum was distinctly unlike the forum to which plaintiffs sought access in the Summum case
(namely, access to a public park for the purpose of donating and erecting permanent
monuments), such that application of the forum doctrine to the access sought by Summum would
“almost inexorably lead to the closing of the forum.” 338 Unlike the right of access to a public
park to erect permanent monuments, the Trump/Twitter plaintiffs’ requested access was to a
forum that is capable of accommodating -- and regularly does accommodate -- an unlimited
amount of speech in the form of replies and retweets. 339
In considering the second factor -- whether the speech in the forum was closely identified
in the public mind with the government -- the court properly found that while the president’s
tweets themselves were identified in the public mind with the president, the same could not be
said for the interactive space (individuals' replies, retweets, likes, etc.) associated with each
presidential tweet. 340 Notably, each reply to a presidential tweet is associated and displayed with
the account information (including the picture, name, and Twitter handle) of the replying user

335

See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 571.
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 570 (quoting Matal, 137 S.
Ct. at 1760).
337
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572.
338
See Summum, 555 U.S. at 480.
339
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 573.The record showed that
each tweet from @realDonaldTrump regularly engenders tens of thousands and upwards of hundreds of
thousands of replies and retweets. Stipulation Paras. 41-43.
340
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572.
336

65
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249489

and is not endorsed in any way by the government. 341 Unlike the specialty license plates
involved in the Walker case -- in which each specialty plate, in addition to bearing the specialty
message, also had “TEXAS” prominently displayed on it, and was issued by the state as a form
of official identification 342 -- and unlike the permanent monuments accepted for display within
the public park in Summum, 343 the reply tweets at issue in the Trump/Twitter case are not
associated in the public mind with the government. 344 Rather, the speech at issue in the
Trump/Twitter case is more akin to the speech at issue in Matal v. Tam 345 -- the trademarks that
private entities create and seek to secure for protection by the Patent and Trademark Office -which the Court found to be associated in the public mind with private speakers, not with the
government, and to be private speech not government speech. 346
Finally, in evaluating whether the interactive space associated with each presidential
tweet constituted government speech, the court examined the third factor -- whether the
government maintained control over the speech in the forum. 347 The court observed that each
reply tweet to a presidential tweet is controlled solely by the replying user herself, such that no
other Twitter user (including the president) can alter the content of any reply, and that the
government maintains no control over reply tweets (other than wielding the power to block the
341

See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572 (emphasizing the
“prominence” of the replying user’s account information in the replying tweet).
342
See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248 (2015)
(emphasizing the “clear governmental nature of the plates”).
343
See Summum, 555 U.S. at 472 (finding clear government speech in the monuments that “the City
decided to accept”).
344
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572 (“[T]he reply is unlikely
to be ‘closely identified in the public mind’ with the sender, even when the sender of the tweet being
replied to is a governmental one.”) (quoting Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017)).
345
137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
346
See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1760. Notably, the Supreme Court in Matal v. Tam warned against the
government’s attempt to extend the government speech doctrine to a broader and broader array of
circumstances, which would have the effect of diminishing the protections of the Free Speech Clause:
“[i]f private speech could be passed off as government speech by simply affixing a government seal of
approval, government could silence or muffle the expression of disfavored viewpoints.” Id. at 1748.
347
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572.
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user from following the president on his @RDT Twitter account entirely). 348 This is in contrast
to the speech at issue on the specialty license plates in the Walker case, in which the state
exercised “sole control over the design, typeface, color, and alphanumeric pattern for all license
plates,” and was vested by law with the final authority to approve every specialty license plate
design proposal before the design could appear on a Texas plate. 349 The court held that such
government control of speech, which supported the conclusion in Walker that the speech at issue
was government speech not private speech within a public forum, is completely lacking from the
forum at issue in the Trump/Twitter case, as neither the president nor any government official
has the ability to control the replies, retweets, or other speech in the interactive space associated
with each presidential tweet.
In summary, applying the factors of whether the relevant forum was constrained by
inherent selectivity and scarcity, whether the speech within the forum was closely identified in
the public mind with the government, and whether the government maintained control over the
speech in the forum, the court concluded that the interactive space associated with each
presidential tweet constituted a public forum for private speech subject to the constraints of the
Free Speech Clause, not government speech immune from the application of the Free Speech
Clause. 350
Having concluded that the interactive space associated with the president’s Twitter
account was not government speech and was properly subject to forum analysis under the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, the court then turned to a determination of
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See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572.
See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2249 (2015) (“Texas
law provides that the State ‘has sole control over the design, typeface, color, and alphanumeric pattern for
all license plates.’ The Board must approve every specialty plate design proposal before the design can
appear on a Texas plate.”) (citing §504.005; 43 Tex. Admin. Code §§217.45(i)(7)–(8), 217.52(b)).
350
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572.
349
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which type of forum was involved -- a traditional public forum, a designated public forum, or a
nonpublic forum. 351 Because the Supreme Court has strictly limited the first category to its
historical confines of public streets, sidewalks, and parks, the court quickly moved to an
examination of whether the forum at issue in this case fell within the second or third type of
forum. 352 The Supreme Court has instructed that, in distinguishing designated public forums
from nonpublic forums, courts must “look to the policy and practice of the government to
ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate
as a public forum.” 353 The requisite government intent on this point may be inferred from a
number of factors, including the government’s policy, past practice, the nature of the property,
and its compatibility with expressive activity. 354 Applying these factors to determine whether
the government intended to open up the interactive space associated with each presidential tweet
as a public forum, the court concluded that it did. 355 Judge Buchwald explained that this
interactive space is generally available to the public without limitation (except once an individual
has been blocked by the president), the account was expressly designated as a means of
communication with the American public at large, and the space is fully compatible with a
substantial amount of expressive activity. 356 As the Supreme Court recently recognized in
Packingham v. North Carolina, social media sites like Twitter are the modern-day mediums
through which citizens can “petition their elected representatives and otherwise engage with
them in a direct manner.” 357 Accordingly, the court held that the interactive space associated
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See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 573.
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 573-74.
353
73 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
354
See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802-03.
355
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574.
356
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574.
357
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
352
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with the president’s tweets on his @RDT Twitter account constituted a designated public forum
for expression. 358
Having determined that the space at issue constituted a designated public forum, the court
readily determined that the president’s blocking of the plaintiffs from following him on Twitter
based on their viewpoint was unconstitutional. 359 The Supreme Court has repeatedly and
unequivocally held that viewpoint discrimination directed against speech that is otherwise
permissible within a designated public forum is unconstitutional. 360 The court explained that
there was no conceivable way to interpret the president’s blocking of the plaintiffs after they
criticized him or his policies other than as an act of viewpoint discrimination, which is flatly
illegal within a designated public forum. 361 Accordingly, the court awarded the declaratory
relief sought by the plaintiffs and ordered the president and the other named defendants to cease
blocking the plaintiffs from the president's @RDT Twitter account because of their views. 362

IV. Let Them Speak Their Minds in the Digital Town Hall: How Government Officials Can
Craft Constitutional Social Media Policies
As the discussion of the Governor Hogan, the Commissioner Randalls, and the President
Trump cases indicates, government officials’ social media sites, such as Facebook pages and
Twitter accounts, that facilitate comments, questions, and debate by constituents and members of
358

See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 575.
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 575.
360
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 575. See Rosenberger v.
Rector Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-31 (1995), discussed supra at text accompanying
notes x - y; Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (“When government creates such a forum. . .
‘viewpoint discrimination’ is forbidden”).
361
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 575.
362
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 579. Although the plaintiffs
also sought injunctive relief from the court in the form of a court order mandating the unblocking of the
plaintiffs from the president’s @RDT Twitter account, the court declined to award such relief, in part
because it concluded that declaratory relief was likely to achieve the same result as injunctive relief and in
part because declaratory relief would be less intrusive on the prerogative of the executive and would be
less likely to raise separation of powers concerns. See id.
359
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the public should -- and likely will -- be viewed by courts for First Amendment purposes as
designated public forums, in which viewpoint discrimination by government officials is flatly
prohibited. This means that deleting a constituent's critical comments is unconstitutional. This
also means that wholly blocking an individual from such forums is likely to be impermissible.
However, government officials can craft policies that constitutionally prohibit certain speech
under certain circumstances: (1) if the forum is a limited public forum that is limited to
discussion by a certain class of speakers or certain subjects and the speaker or speech falls
outside these limits, or (2) if the speech itself is not protected by the First Amendment. I discuss
each of these possibilities below.
Although it may be constitutionally permissible in certain circumstances for a
government official to prohibit certain speech on the official’s social media site, courts will most
likely find that it is never constitutionally permissible to outright block an individual from such a
social media site that is open to the public, even if that individual has posted off-topic or illegal
speech in the past. Such an act of blocking would be deemed a prior restraint on that individual’s
(future) speech, which is presumptively unconstitutional. 363 Although courts have upheld limited
restrictions on individuals’ future speech -- such as gag orders imposed on those connected with
judicial proceedings where necessary to protect fair trials 364 or content-neutral, time, place, or
manner injunctions imposed on individuals who have repeatedly violated the law in the past 365 --

363

See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (“Viewpoint discrimination . . . is
presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.”).
364
See e.g., Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
365
See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994) (upholding certain
content-neutral provisions of a state court injunction that prohibited particular anti-abortion protestors
from demonstrating and engaging in other advocacy efforts near abortion clinics and the homes of clinic
employees); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 361 (1997) (upholding
certain content-neutral provisions of state court injunction issued against fifty individuals and three
organizations, including fixed buffer zones which prohibited demonstrating within 15 feet of abortion
clinic doorways, parking lots, and driveways).
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courts have never upheld the wholesale blocking of an individual from speaking in a traditional
or designated public forum. Therefore, blocking an individual from a government official's
social media site will likely never pass constitutional muster.
If a government official opens up her social media site for questions and comments on all
subjects, a court would likely view that site as a general purpose designated public forum and
would strictly scrutinize any effort to prohibit speech within that forum on the basis of content or
viewpoint. As discussed above, courts will subject speech limitations within such general
purpose designated public forums to the same scrutiny as speech restrictions within traditional
public forums. 366 However, when the government creates or designates a public forum by
opening it up for speech, it does not have to open it up for the discussion of all subjects. 367 The
government can create a limited-purpose designated public forum -- or a “limited public forum” - that is dedicated to the discussion of certain topics and/or that is available only for a certain
class of speakers. 368 For example, a school district can constitutionally limit after-school use of
school property to social, civic, educational, and recreational uses, while prohibiting political or

366

See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992). The Perry court explained:
In [traditional public forums or] quintessential public forums, … [f]or the State to enforce a
content-based exclusion, it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. ... …[Similarly,] the Constitution
forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a [designated public] forum generally open to
the public even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place. Although a State is not
required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it does so, it is bound
by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum…. [A] content-based prohibition
must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.... Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
367
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Edu. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (“Control over access to
a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn
are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral) (citing Perry Educ.
Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 49).
368
See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390 (1993) (describing a
limited public forum as “open only for designated purposes”).
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commercial uses of such property. 369 A city council can create an open microphone opportunity
during a council meeting and allow speakers to address any issue on the council’s agenda, but
prohibit discussion of topics that are not on the council’s agenda. A state university can open up
its classrooms for use by student organizations, but not by outside community groups. Such
topic-based or speaker-based restrictions within limited purpose public forums are constitutional,
so long as any prohibitions on speech within the limited public forum are also reasonable in light
of the purposes and subjects of the forum and are not based on viewpoint. By expressly creating
such a limited-purpose public forum, the government officials would be empowered to prohibit
speech that fell outside of such topics, such as commercial advertisements. Similarly, a
government official could open up a Facebook page or Twitter account’s forums to speech on
political and public interest topics, while prohibiting commercial advertisements or solicitation,
for example, within that forum.
In addition, when government officials use social media sites, such as Facebook pages
and Twitter accounts, that invite questions, comments, and debate by constituents and members
of the public, they may constitutionally prohibit speech that is outside the protection of the First
Amendment, including speech that amounts to a true threat, 370 speech that constitutes fighting

369

See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391-92 (holding that while it is constitutional to create a designated
public forum with such limited purposes as social, civic, and recreational uses, it is unconstitutional to
prohibit religious uses of such property); Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 553 U.S. 98, 10809 (2001) (holding that while it is constitutional to create a designated public forum with such limited
purposes as instruction in education, learning, the arts, social, civic, recreational, and entertainment uses
pertaining to the community welfare, it is unconstitutional to prohibit the use of the property for religious
purposes.)
370
True threats -- statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals -- are statements that
are not protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). However,
threatening speech regarding a government official may be more likely to be viewed as mere “political
hyperbole” and therefore protected by the First Amendment. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705
(1969) (defendant’s statement “If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights
is L.B.J. [President Lyndon B. Johnson]” was not a true threat within the meaning of a statute that made it
a crime to knowingly and willfully threaten the life of the president, but was rather a “kind of political
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words, 371 speech that is obscene, 372 and speech that contains child pornography. 373 While speech
within the last two categories (obscenity and child pornography) is less likely to be posted on a
government official’s social media site, and while the second category of unprotected speech
(fighting words) appears to be an anachronism, 374 it is not unrealistic to expect that speech that
arguably falls within the first category of unprotected speech -- true threats -- would be posted in
an online forum, and the government official who hosts the forum may constitutionally prohibit
such speech. However, the ultimate determination of the illegality of any such post must await a
judicial determination, since speech cannot be censored by a government official prior to a
judicial determination of its illegality, pursuant to the prior restraint doctrine. 375 Under the prior

hyperbole” and a “crude offensive method of stating political opposition to the president”). For a recent
controversy regarding speech that was allegedly threatening to the President of the United States, consider
the uproar over comedian Kathy Griffin’s picture of herself holding a replica of the decapitated head of
President Trump. See https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/05/31/did-kathy-griffin-breaklaw-her-photo-decapitated-trump/356840001/
371
In the 1942 case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the Supreme Court held that
“fighting words” -- words that “men of common intelligence would understand to be words likely to
cause an average addressee to fight” -- were not protected by the First Amendment.
372
In Miller v. California, the Supreme Court set forth the following three-part definition of obscene
speech, which is outside the protection of the First Amendment: “(a) whether the average person,
applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). But obscenity prosecutions that do
not also involve child pornography prosecutions are relatively rare. See
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/us/28obscene.html (fewer than two dozen federal obscenity
prosecutions have been brought that did not also involve child pornography).
373
In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), the Court held that child pornography, defined as visual
depictions of minors engaged in sexual activity, was outside the protection of the First Amendment.
374
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that fighting words are outside the protection of the
First Amendment, since its 1942 decision in Chaplinsky, the Court has never since held that any speech
actually fell within this category of unprotected speech. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 442, n.3
(2011) (reiterating that the category of “fighting words” is outside the protection of the First Amendment,
but holding that Westboro Baptist Church’s speech at military funeral -- including posters with the words
“God Hates Fags” and “God Hates You” -- did not fall within this unprotected category).
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As I have explored in great detail elsewhere, any restraint on speech that is imposed by a government
official prior to a judicial determination of the speech’s illegality constitutes a prior restraint on speech
that is presumptively unconstitutional. See, e.g., Dawn Carla Nunziato, How (Not) To Censor: Procedural
First Amendment Values and Internet Censorship Worldwide, 42 Geo. J. Int'l L. 1123 (2011); Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 58 (1963).
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restraint doctrine, any restriction on or censorship of speech by a government official prior to a
judicial determination of the speech’s illegality constitutes a prior restraint on speech that is
presumptively unconstitutional. Therefore, even if the government official believes that the
speech at issue constitutes an unprotected true threat or falls within one of the other categories of
unprotected speech discussed above, removal or censorship of such speech by the government
official prior to a judicial determination of the speech’s illegality would constitute a
presumptively illegal prior restraint. 376 Accordingly, government officials have very limited
authority to remove speech with the designated public forums constituted by their social media
sites.
Conclusion
When government officials, like Maryland Governor Larry Hogan and President Donald
J. Trump, use social media sites like Facebook and Twitter to engage and interact with their
constituents on matters related to their governance, they are creating modern-day public forums
for speech. Although the media itself in which these interactions take place is of recent vintage,
allowing for interactions between those who govern and those who are governed has long been
recognized as vital to our system of democratic self-governance. Such interactions between
government officials and their constituents form the heart of our system of democratic selfgovernment and must continue to be protected from censorship in the digital age, which is why
viewpoint discrimination within such forums is flatly unconstitutional under the Supreme
Court’s well-developed public forum jurisprudence. Despite the modern-day context of such
interchanges, the interactions themselves remain at the core of the First Amendment's protections
376

See, e.g., New York Times v. United States (striking down Nixon Administration’s injunctions against
publication of portions of The Pentagon Papers by New York Times and Washington Post, stating that
“every moment's continuance of the injunctions against these newspapers [prior to judicial determination
of the publication’s illegality] amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First
Amendment.”) (per curiam) (Black, J., concurring).
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for free speech. The Court’s explanation of this point remains as important today as when the
Court ushered in the public forum doctrine eighty years ago:
The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its
citizens to [consult] in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.
. . . Such use of [public forums] has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United
States to use [public forums] for communication of views on national questions . . . must
not . . . be abridged or denied. 377
Whether public forums are recognized in the town square or in the Twittersphere, these forums
remain vital to our system of democratic self-government and must continue to be protected from
government censorship in the digital age.
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Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 494, 513-16 (1939).
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